ABSTRACT Over the last 25 years, there has been much work on multimedia digital watermarking. In this domain, the primary limitation to watermark strength has been in its visibility. For multimedia watermarks, invisibility is defined in human terms (that is, in terms of human sensory limitations). In this paper, we review recent developments in the non-media applications of data watermarking, which have emerged over the last decade as an exciting new sub-domain. Since by definition, the intended receiver should be able to detect the watermark, we have to redefine invisibility in an acceptable way that is often application-specific and thus cannot be easily generalized. In particular, this is true when the data is not intended to be directly consumed by humans. For example, a loose definition of robustness might be in terms of the resilience of a watermark against normal host data operations, and of invisibility as resilience of the data interpretation against change introduced by the watermark. In this paper, we classify the data in terms of data mining rules on complex types of data such as time-series, symbolic sequences, data streams, and so forth. We emphasize the challenges involved in non-media watermarking in terms of common watermarking properties, including invisibility, capacity, robustness, and security. With the aid of a few examples of watermarking applications, we demonstrate these distinctions and we look at the latest research in this regard to make our argument clear and more meaningful. As the last aim, we look at the new challenges of digital watermarking that have arisen with the evolution of big data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital watermarking is the practice of embedding extra information within digital content, also called host data, in a manner that does not interfere with the normal usage of data. An example is Google Maps images that are obtained from satellites used for applications such as urban planning, environmental protection, and defense [1] . These images contain logo patterns that become visible only in a high resolution version. Normal visible use is not compromised by these logos, although data analytics on the images may well be affected at high resolution.
Since the late 1990s, there has been an explosion in the number of digital watermarking techniques developed mostly for the rights protection of multimedia contents. In such scenarios, it is always desirable that the hidden marks be imperceptible to the human user. This requirement is called the invisibility of the watermark. It is thus useful to incorporate the characteristics of the human visual system for images and video or the human auditory system for audio to design an invisible watermark. Taking advantages of human perceptual weaknesses is not limited to digital watermarking; compression algorithms such as those used in JPEG and MPEG also use human vision weakness for reducing the size of images by eliminating redundancy in a way that is not detectable to the human. Indeed, conventional watermark invisibility has as part of its definition the assumption that a human is going to consume the data. Now consider sensory readings such as temperature or humidity data streams as an example of non-media host data. Whereas small changes in image data may not be visible to humans, whether such alterations to data are visible to downstream processing requires a whole new definition of invisibility. This type of streaming data has become more ubiquitous as technology is evolving and the prices of portable devices are falling. This increase in data availability on which data mining and knowledge discovery techniques are applied, has implications of security, privacy, and in the case of big data, veracity/reliability. To address these last 3 issues, watermarking techniques can be used to enrich data with some hidden information so as to make the gathered data more trustworthy and also to justify the efforts made for initial data collection. A question that arises is what invisibility means.
Clearly, here what really matters is invisibility to the downstream data processing, not to any human, since the data has been designed for machine ingestion. Even in the case of multimedia, the embedded watermark is never invisible to the watermark detector that is usually a computer. The difference is that in multimedia watermarking what the computer 'sees' is not what the human sees. In the case of data watermarking, this distinction does not necessarily hold.
In addition to the invisibility definition, another challenge is related to watermark robustness, which means hidden marks are required to be detectable even in the presence of data alterations [2] . Media watermarking schemes are usually designed to survive a number of common media operations such as compression, cropping, geometric transformations, but in the case of non-media data such as time-series or spatiotemporal data, the normal operations are different (such as summarization, sampling, clustering, and other data or dimensional reduction techniques). These processes are all characterized by significant loss in data volume, thus defeating most of the watermarking methods designed for multimedia [12] .
A major difficulty in watermarking generic data types is that one cannot count on the large noise bandwidth assumption, so common in the multimedia domain. Some sensitive data such as salary, property coordinates, or biological data cannot tolerate even a small distortion to their original values. As a result, other places for watermarking should be investigated. For example, in [86] , the authors embedded provenance information in timing differences between consecutive packets in a sensor network. While this might betray the watermarking definition as the embedding procedure involves change of timing information that is part of the header not within the data itself, we argue that this could also be considered as a watermarking scheme if one is collecting headers and may not care about the data.
A router is a good example of our justification since it just deals with the header information and does not care about the packet content that are of interest of the intended receiver. Therefore, the visibility definition depends on whom we are hiding from and what is the purpose of embedding. That is an obvious question in the case of multimedia but is potentially a complex challenge for non-media data types.
Motivated by these differences, in this work, we focus on digital watermarking techniques of non-media data and demonstrate how main watermarking requirements are impacted by data model. For a dataset D (either discrete or continuous), having knowledge about its characteristics is the first step to determine the digital watermarking technique that most suits the intended application. Prior works on numerical and categorical data watermarking have mainly focused on the traditional relational model, where each record is a tuple with one or more attributes. In this work we take one step back to look at instead a broader complex data taxonomy inspired form data mining domain including timeseries, biological sequences, graph-structured data, spatial, spatiotemporal, and streaming data [10] . Then, we exclude multimedia from consideration and shed lights on digital watermarking properties/requirements of the watermarking methods for each particular data type. Now, we briefly review preliminary backgrounds of digital watermarking that are needed to follow our discussions.
A. BACKGROUND
Through history, digital watermarking was widely used for hiding some information within a given content. This leads us to a discussion of information hiding in general and steganography in particular. Steganography and digital watermarking are two related fields that share many technical approaches but there are fundamental differences between them.
While steganography aims at hiding information in such a way that it should not be even possible to detect the existence of a secret message, in digital watermarking, the effective coupling of a message to the digital content is of value and therefore the watermark embedding process is usually known. Moreover, in steganography, the host data can be a mere 'decoy' and may have no relationship to the secret message. In contrast, a watermark usually carries supplementary information about the host data such as sender identifier or data provenance information [4] .
One could consider both techniques as a way for making embedded information 'disappear' within the host data [5] . This perspective raises the possibility of encryption techniques as a solution for hiding information. However, encryption is not successful in diverting attention away from suspected data, but also after decryption all the protection is lost which means there is no guarantee that the legitimate data decoder does not distribute the information. In fact, watermarking and encryption are more complementary than competitive approaches and can be used in conjunction to provide maximum security [5] .
Generally a watermarking system consists of two components: watermark encoder or embedder and watermark decoder/extractor or detector. The watermark encoder embeds a watermark message M , possibly utilizing a secret key K , within the data set D also referred to as cover data or host data. Occasionally, we might want K to depend on D in order to provide side-information to the decoder or use asymmetric keys to boost the security of the VOLUME 4, 2016 watermarking scheme. The encoder generates a marked dataset D m using an encoding function f such that D m = f (D, M , K ). The output of the encoder D m is recorded for later use or transmitted through a channel that is often subjected to either data processing distortion or attacks that attempt in removing any trace of M from the modified dataset D m . Then, the transmitted watermarked data D m is presented as an input to the watermark decoder. The decoder investigates if the watermark information is present in the given input D m , and if so, outputs the encoded message i.e. M = g( D m , K), where g is the decoding function. Fig. 1 depicts general building blocks of a watermarking system. The dotted line in this figure shows the possibility of having access to the original data D in the decoding procedure, termed blind or informed watermark detection. Since some watermarks have no message at all -it is their mere presence that is the message such as [3] -the output of g() could be a binary value (Yes or No). The common embedding rules for the encoding function f are additive or multiplicative. In additive schemes, watermark samples are linearly added to the samples of the original data (D) with the power p to control the watermark distortion, whereas in multiplicative schemes samples of D are first multiplied by an independent signal's samples and then combined with the watermark samples. There is also another embedding rule, termed quantization that embeds the watermark by changing the quantization values of data samples D such that watermark is statistically independent of the original data [1] .
The existing watermarking schemes can also be classified based on the domain in which information is embedded either in spatial domain or transform domain [2] . This classification comes from representation of media; an image can be represented in spatial domain by their pixel values and in transform domain by their spatial frequency coefficients. Similarly, watermarks can be embedded within an image by modifying the pixel values such as Least Significant Bits (LSBs) of the pixels or the transform domain coefficients such as discrete cosine transform (DCT) or discrete wavelet transform (DWT). A possible alternative is embedding watermark using the combined spatial and frequency domain in order to increase the degree of protection.
Whether the watermark is embedded in spatial or frequency domain, a watermarking system is usually characterized by a number of properties the most important of which include visibility, capacity, robustness, and security [2] .
Visibility that is also called invisibility, imperceptibility or transparency, means that embedding process should not introduce any visible distortion in the host, or at least it needs to be invisible to humans. To quantify watermark perceptibility, usually a suitable distortion function is defined that measures the similarity between data before and after watermark insertion. One example is the Just-Noticeable Difference (JND) [2] which clearly depends on human perception.
Capacity or data payload indicates the optimum amount of information that can be embedded in the host data. i.e. the size of the message M . Robustness typically accounts for the capability of watermark to survive common host data operations, which do not explicitly aim at removing the watermark or at making it unreadable. Finally, security is the ability of watermarks to resist attacks that are intended to thwart the watermark purpose such as unauthorized removal, or unauthorized detection.
From now we confine our attention to non-media data type. For an extensive bibliography of watermarking and steganography, readers are referred to [2] and [7] . Also for a discussion of recent open problems in multimedia steganography see [8] .
B. DATA TAXONOMY
Broadly speaking, there are many features of data, by which they can be characterized. The basic data types typically refer to multidimensional data as a collection of data records in relational databases. The records consist of attributes of types nominal, binary, ordinal, and numeric. As opposed to this simple type of data, the complex data types can be classified as follows:
• Sequence Data: This type of data includes an ordered list of items and can be further categorized into timeseries, symbolic sequences, and biological data [11] . A times-series is a sequence of numerical data typically recorded at equal time intervals. A symbolic sequence can be considered as the categorical analogy of a timeseries, which is not observed at equal time-intervals such as a sequence of user actions at a Website. Proteins and nucleotides are examples of biological sequences that carry important semantic structure for genetic analysis.
• Graph Structured Data: This type of data such as social network data or Web graphs conforms to a graph structure so that the data values correspond to the graph vertices, whereas the relationship among those values correspond to the edges in the graph. Additionally, data encoded with Markup languages such as XML schemas can be represented with graph structures.
• Other Kinds of Data: In addition to sequences and graphs where data poses certain structures, there are other kinds of data that does not lend itself into a specific structure. The most important types of such data include spatial data, spatiotemporal data, data streams, multimedia data and text. Spatial data such as a map identifies spatial information about objects. Spatiotemporal is a particular form of spatial data related to both space and time such as trajectories of a moving object.
A data stream is usually defined in contrast to a persistent relation and it flows into a system often in vast volume and unbounded size. Based on these various data types (excluding symbolic sequences, multimedia and text), we present a taxonomy of the existing data watermarking methods in Section IV. Note that, in our taxonomy, various data types could fit in multiple categories such as watermarking methods proposed for timeseries data-stream [40] , trajectory streams [73] , or XML data streams [21] .
Finally, the potential of big-data driven systems necessitates investigation of digital watermarking methods for such data. Big data could possibly contain any of the data types in our taxonomy, or a mix of them, but it is chiefly characterized by large volume and high speed of acquisition, often making confirmation of the data difficult. Digital watermarking can be useful for improving the ability to assert the veracity of big-data streams particularly for sensor networks in large scale, by offering audit opportunities beyond the simple checksum. In Section V, we discuss big data implications on digital watermarking.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS

This paper is motivated by the following question for a particular type of data: What information hiding or digital watermarking technique is appropriate to use considering the specific features of the data with regards to the targeted application objective?
A large corpus of watermarking techniques has arisen proposed for digital images, audio and video, but the challenges and issues of non-media watermarking have not been fully investigated. The contribution of this work is threefold:
1. We present a new data taxonomy model inspired from data mining research and review the most valuable watermarking techniques for them. The rationale for choosing this taxonomy is that the ultimate goal of data collection is gaining knowledge through data mining process and therefore the watermarking system should be designed in compatible with the data mining goals. Therefore, the type of data will not only affect the data mining methods but also data hiding techniques. 2. We provide a new outlook to watermarking of non-media data and demonstrate the differences and challenges in this regard. In particular, we compare these challenges under the standard categories of visibility, capacity, robustness, and security and investigate how the definitions of these properties will be changed, 3. In addition to the conventional watermarking usage scenarios, we manifest a wide range of applications for data hiding methods that have been sprung up recently. Additionally, we look at the future of digital watermarking for big data and Internet of Things (IoT). Before going further, we emphasize that we do not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of all the techniques that have been developed in non-media domain; instead we have tried to develop a systematic presentation of the fundamental ideas, emphasizing the differences and the basic methods that one needs to know in order to find a proper watermarking technique for his/her dataset.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section II, we elaborate the differences between media and non-media watermarking of data. Section III investigates recent applications of data watermarking. In Section IV, we review archetypical data hiding techniques following the data taxonomy presented in section II. Section V, covers new trends in digital watermarking of big data and IoT domains, with section VI concluding the paper and suggesting the overall state of the art for future works.
II. FOUR PROPERTIES OF NON-MEDIA WATERMARKING
In this section, we describe challenges for non-media data watermarking usage in terms of four main properties of any watermarking system. These are: the watermark invisibility to the application using the host data; the embedding data capacity of any embedded message; the robustness of the watermark against non-deliberate changes in the data that might be invisible to the application, but potentially damaging to the watermark; and security against deliberate attacks on the watermark while preserving the utility of the attacked data. The near-equivalence of the last two properties allows us to merge their descriptions in subsequent sections, pointing out differences between the two definitions where they apply. We expand on this equivalence in subsections C and D below.
A. INVISIBILITY
For media watermarking, the definition is conceptually straightforward -the watermark is either visible (or audible) to a human, or not. The definition of visibility/audibility is a characteristic of humans whose perceptual characteristics are now fairly well defined. For data, it is the application that defines 'visibility' (which can also be described as detectability, or on influencing, or biasing the interpretation of the marked data by the application).
Defining watermark invisibility for the non-media data type is a complex topic. The main difficulty is ''who needs to know that the watermark is embedded and who does not?''. For answering this question, identification of the target of the embedded watermark is a paramount need. Taking the example of images, it is sufficient that the watermark be invisible to human eyes, and for audio, it should be inaudible to human ears. In this respect, past research utilized limitations of the human visual and psychoacoustic systems advantageously in the delivery and presentation of digital media (such as temporal and spatial contrast thresholds, orientation sensitivity, etc) to hide information. Similarly, for non-media, the characteristics of the data consumer dictate the watermark invisibility requirement.
Sion et al. [80] addressed the problem of watermarking streaming data such as sensory readings and argued that for such data any watermark-related alterations can be induced as long as the host data still 'seems' good. This definition is inherently subjective, in the sense that the degree of precision VOLUME 4, 2016 and accuracy that corresponds to the 'good' definition varies based on the application. For instance, consider Electrocardiogram signals (ECGs) that are widely captured for detecting heart problems. For this case, watermark invisibility is a matter of preserving heart diagnosis that is highly dependent on the timing of ECG dominant features i.e. PQRST complex wave structures within ECGs. Here the noise existence assumption that we already discussed still exists because the precise positioning of the probe on the chest can result in larger differences than watermark distortion could do.
The visibility problem could become even more challenging under this property. A human can always visualize an ECG and make broad judgment based on its shape and therefore human visual system may still play a role in this case. However, for many data embedding environments, human visual system does not play a role. As an example, consider a sensor network for monitoring the environment variables such as temperature or humidity. Since, the real sensor measurements are inherently noisy, it gives us the opportunity to take advantage for embedding watermarks in the noisy parts in a way that the perceived quality of the sensory data is not degraded. This immediately implies the need for a proper quality metric to measure distortion between original data D and the watermarked data D m .
Multimedia watermarking schemes often use statistical descriptors including first order statistics (such as histograms) or second order statistics (such as correlations between pixels) to compare the two piece of data before and after watermarking. However, it is well known that these metrics correlate well with the way degradations are perceived by a human observer that is not a valid assumption for non-media data [85] . Furthermore, the limitation of visual models such as JND for geospatial dataset is acknowledged here [61] .
Apart from statistical descriptors and visual metrics, it is folklore from the signal processing literature that classical metrics such as Percentage Residual Difference (PRD), Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR), or Mean Maximum Error (MME) be used for measuring the degradation of the host signal. The main shortage of these metrics is that all samples contribute equally for the assessment of the signal quality and therefore are not necessary suitable for capturing changes in a same way that the quality of the signal changes [13] .
In all of the above examples, the host data is still noisy. Indeed the majority of the watermarking methods have been derived under the assumption that the host data can tolerate damages to its values up to a certain point. But for some particular type of data such as prices or property coordinates, even small changes to the data values may not be acceptable. In other words, an invisible watermark should be designed in such a way that 'distortion constraints' of the host data be satisfied. For example, Kamel proposed a distortionfree watermarking scheme for spatial data stored in a structure called R-tree [20] . In this work, instead of changing data values, the information is encoded within the order of entries inside the R-tree nodes relative to the watermark values.
Summarizing, the invisibility definition requires a good understanding of the data model features as well as the target application. Taking example of provenance [86] where the information is embedded within time differences between consecutive packets, the watermark said to be invisible if it does not introduce large delays in the network. For marking graph structures such as social network data whereby a few vertices or edges are added to the original graph according to watermark values, the watermark is invisible if the number of modified vertices and edges are small and therefore the main properties of the graph such as average path length or its diameter are preserved [58] . In the case of watermarking of biological sequences such as DNA, the watermark invisibility means identical amino acid as that of the original DNA [48] (we explain it later in Section IV). Apart from that, there is the lack of a well-defined evaluation profile for non-media watermark invisibility that requires further research.
B. ROBUSTNESS
In the design of any watermarking scheme, the ability to withstand host data distortions introduced through standard and legitimate data processing is defined as robustness [2] . Standard data processing includes all host data manipulations and modifications that the data might undergo during its distribution chain. Examples of such processing in media domain are lossy compression, rotation, quantization, noise reduction, delay, and so on. Based on the degree of resistance, a watermark could be either fragile or robust. A fragile watermark fails to be detectable even after the slightest modification to the host data and therefore is useful for tamper proofing usages.
In contrast, a robust watermark often resists moderate to severe distortions unless an unreasonable amount of damage has been inflicted upon and it is useful for ownership assertion or traitor tracing purposes. In addition to the robustness against common data processing, some scholars such as Hartung and Kutter [14] considered resistancy against both intentional and unintentional watermark damages as robustness. This led to some confusion in the boundaries between watermark robustness and watermark security as we discuss later (subsection II.D). For brevity, we only consider resilience against any modifications that have relevance to the watermark extraction, but not to the application, as it is within noise levels, and treat resilience against any modifications beyond that as security.
The robustness requirement can vary greatly due to different targeted applications. Consider a monitoring application where enormous quantities of data are streamed through a network. Let's assume we have embedded watermark information into a data stream for authentication purposes and then we want to summarize it. What happens to the embedded watermark? Are we still able to detect the watermark after the summarization process? If the streaming data are transmitted through a lossy network such as UDP that has no guarantees of data delivery, the watermark chain could be broken by loss of a few packets and therefore subsequent packets cannot be authenticated [84] . Hence, for this scenario, robustness against data summarization as well as packet loss is desired.
For watermarking of relational databases, Sion et al. proposed a watermarking scheme that is robust against joint operations meaning that tuples that join before and after watermark insertion are the same [12] . For right protection of trajectory dataset, Lucchese et al. proposed a novel watermarking scheme in a way that the k nearest neighbour (KNN) of every object in dataset is preserved after watermark insertion that is important for classification usage [33] . This means that the watermark is robust against NN-search and NN-classification operations. For the DNA watermarking, the embedded watermark is essential to withstand DNA mutations that might occur due to either gene's evolution process or environmental factors [48] .
C. CAPACITY
Data capacity refers to the amount of information one can embed into any single piece of data. A watermark that encodes n bits, can embed 2 n different messages and is referred to as multiple bit watermarking. In contrast, a zerobit watermark carries no hidden message, which means only the presence/absence of a watermark can be investigated. An example is [3] . Also, capacity is sometimes given relative to the size of the host data i.e.
|M | size(D)
. For instance, the capacity of a watermarked video can be measured by number of embedded bits per frame, or for DNA watermarking, it could be expressed by the number of bits that is encoded per nucleotide. Some other references, consider the number of correctly retrieved bits as the watermark capacity.
The estimation of the data capacity is a function of the encoding method f . The common multimedia watermarking methods includes LSB addition/substitution, Quantization Index Modulation (QIM), spread spectrum (SS), and Patchwork [2] . For example, in the SS technique, a pseudorandom number generator (PNRG) is used to produce a 'chip sequence' and then the generated watermark is added or subtracted from the host data. Therefore, the number of watermark bits is equal to the period of the chip sequence (L) and the bit rate for 1-bit SS encoding is 1/L bits per sample. Higher data capacity could be achieved using the QIM technique, which operates by perturbing the quantization process in a way that a message is stored in that perturbation [9] .
The evaluation of the maximum number of information bits that can be hidden in a piece of data plays a major role in a watermarking system. For many types of non-media data such as relational data or trajectories, the redundancy is far less compared to the multimedia and therefore less space is available for hiding information [72] . Apart from data redundancy, the location of hidden information can change the data-carrying capacity of a watermarking system. Multimedia watermarking methods often put watermarks in specific regions that are not of interests (non-ROI) to make sure the watermarks do not interfere with the important parts of the host data. For non-media domain, unlike conventional digital watermarking, hiding is not just restricted inside the content. For instance, Kamel placed watermarks information into relative order of entries in databases instead of the data [20] and Wang and Reeves inserted watermarks in differences between the adjacent coordinates of vertices in a vector map [93] .
The performance of a watermarking system is tightly related to the three described watermarking properties being invisibility, robustness and capacity. These requirements are often contradictory; the less hidden information, the strongest invisibility could be attained with the cost of decrease in watermark robustness. In contrast, the higher data capacity improves the robustness while the invisibility constraint might be violated. This apparent contradiction can be demonstrated by a 'magic triangle' model [23] , where invisibility, robustness and capacity are in the upper, left and right corners of the triangle correspondingly. Similar to the multimedia domain, a trade-off must be sought in order to satisfy these requirements based on a particular application environment. Fig. 2 represents a sample of the magic triangle for each of the non-media data type that we review in Section IV.
D. SECURITY
In the last few decades, the watermarking security issue has become one of the main challenges facing the design of watermarking techniques and there has been criticism that many proposed watermarking security solutions are weak or not as strong as they claim [18] . Regardless of the data type, we have identified a few challenges for watermark security herein.
Firstly, the separation between watermark security and watermark robustness can be very ill-defined. For example, according to Cox's et al. definition [2] , security is the watermark resistance against any intentional attempt by an adversary to impair watermark detection, as opposed to the normal data processing that a robust watermark should survive. This isolation assumes that the intention behind every operation is known and deterministic. In a real scenario, an innocent-looking operation might compromise the watermark usability, but one may not necessarily be able to say whether it is deliberate or not. Fig. 3 shows the ambivalence in the separation of robustness and security. In Fig. 3 (a) , the resilience against normal data operations and attacks are depicted as two disjoint sets of robustness and security. Although, some overlaps are revealed between the two sets in the Fig 3 (b) .
For example, quantization is a useful compression operation mostly for images and speech processing and therefore it belongs to the robustness set. However, it is possible that an adversary quantize watermarked data to damage the watermark, while keeping the alterations within allowable bounds. In such circumstances, it is too strict to conclude whether the operation is malicious or innocent. Thus, the two sets overlaps, but they are never identical as attacks to security includes a broader scope than attacks to robustness and therefore, we can conclude that robustness is not sufficient for security [18] . Secondly, the security of a watermarking system depends largely on the considered application meaning that each application may require its own type of security. There are many applications where weak security is sufficient and preferable to no security mainly because there is no motivation for data tampering such as device control applications [3] . On the other hand, there are some applications in particular for data authentication and data trustworthiness in hostile environments where the most harmful attacks beyond unauthorized watermark detection or removal are motivated. In other words, 'the security level' of the desired application plays the key role in defining watermarking security.
Thirdly, the watermark security is usually determined by making assumption about the amount of information that is available to an intruder or threat model. Many watermarking systems are designed based on the ''security through obscurity'' approach, which means that data is secured through obscuring how it is secured. In other works, the assumption here is that the data hiding algorithm is not publicly revealed [15] . The contrary argument in cryptography is the Kerckhoff's principle which states that we must assume that the opponent knows the details of all aspects of the cryptosystem except for the secret key that is shared between the transmitter and receiver [16] . The adoption of Kerckhoffs' principle for a secure watermarking system is advocated by Furon et al. [18] . This implies that the embedding function f is known to the adversary and therefore watermark message M is encoded by means of an encryption algorithm before embedding in a way that it is computationally infeasible for the opponent to guess the hidden codes.
Fourthly, the security evaluation of a watermarking system is as critical as designing a secure watermark in first place. Most of the watermarking schemes are claimed to be robust and secure, but there is no attempt to address the fundamental question of just how secure they are. As the multimedia watermarking is mature enough, there are several digital watermarking benchmarking tools such as StirMark, Certimark, Checkmark, Optimark and the Watermark Evaluation Testbed (WET) [17] , [23] . In contrast, non-media information watermarking techniques suffer from the lack of a common benchmark to quantify watermarking resistance against attacks. This is understandable given the wide variety of data uses and types, but until such a standard emerges, there may be reluctance to see the value of watermarking.
Addressing all of the aforementioned challenges are necessary (though ambitious) to achieve perfect security for a digital watermarking system. The main problem is that there is no consensus about a secure watermarking system and little research identifies security architecture for watermarking systems in particular for non-media data type. In the next Section, we review the application of non-media data hiding techniques in more detail.
III. NON-MEDIA DATA HIDING APPLICATIONS
Cox and Miller [3] classified the potential applications of digital watermarking techniques during the first 50 years of its birth into six main category of transaction tracking (fingerprinting), proof of ownership, copy control, authentication, legacy system enhancement, and database linkage.
A fingerprint is a watermark that is different for each instance and can uniquely identify the legal recipient of an authorized copy. Hence, the source of illegally re-distributed content can be traced. One of the most quoted applications of digital watermarking is proof of ownership in a court of law, in particular when multiple ownership claims are made (deadlock problem [2] ). A copy-control watermarking system has the available technologies to inhibit copying of copyrighted materials. A concealed watermark can also be used as an authentication code or tamper-proof of a given piece of data. It is also possible to use watermarks as pointers for linking to subsequent information such as a Website or a live channel. Similarly, many applications such as Shazam or Youtube use audio finger printing for performing automatic content recognition.
Apart from the aforementioned applications, there are other advantageous usages for digital watermarking. For example, distortion-dependent watermarking can be used for measuring data quality degradation as a substitution to inefficient retransmission techniques that not only consume the bandwidth, but also do not necessarily capture all data degradation occurred in the original data itself [24] . The other promising solution that watermarks offer is proxy-based data transmission [25] ; instead of transmitting a high resolution image or video over a low-bandwidth network, a watermarked version of that content in a lower quality is transmitted, and upon retrieving the watermark payload, the higher quality version of that content can be transmitted through another high-speed channel. Additionally, a watermark can be embedded for monitoring of airplay of advertisements on commercial radio broadcast to confirm the promises of a radio station operator. For this purpose, the number of times the watermark occurs during a given broadcast period is counted [26] .
In the following section, we look at the recent applications of digital watermarking for non-multimedia data. Although some of the new applications are essentially old ones, but the new setting and how they can be applied in real-world scenarios are interesting.
A. SENSOR NETWORKS 1) SECURE IN-NETWORK DATA AGGREGATION
In-network aggregation of data is essential for wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in order to improve the bandwidth usage and energy efficiency. There is always a conflict between security and data aggregation needs in such networks [77] : security methods require sensors to encrypt and authenticate any sensed data prior to their transmission, while data aggregation protocols prefer plain data to maximize energy. These conflicting goals had led to a large body of research on the secure data aggregation problem using a variety of techniques such as digital signatures, cryptography algorithms, homomorphic encryption, random sampling, anomaly detection, to name a few. The proposed aggregate-commit-prove protocol [78] is an example of such schemas where the aggregator not only performs the aggregation operation, but also proves the correctness of the performed task.
Digital watermarking is a promising substitution for many of the proposed complex security procedures to solve this problem. In particular, the Spread Spectrum watermarking technique has important features such resilience against various transformations and simple embedding operations that make it suitable for aggregation supportive environments such as sensor networks [79] . The first attempt to construct the SS watermarks for secure data aggregation is raised by Zhang et al. [83] . The presented method visualizes the sensory data gathered from the whole network at a certain time snapshot as an image, in which every sensor node is viewed as a pixel with its sensory data representing the pixel intensity. Then, watermark bits are spread based upon orthogonal pseudorandom modulation pulses to avoid interfering.
Recently, Soltani Panah et al. [79] proposed a composite watermark-based solution in which several (near) orthogonal patterns are embedded into several data streams. The unique construction of watermark patterns not only decreases the VOLUME 4, 2016 complexity of the SS watermark detection, but also make the scheme scalable by using a hierarchical labeling approach.
2) SECURE QUERY PROCESSING
In a sensor network, typically a sink node queries the sensors for obtaining some results. In the literature, the secure query processing have two possible meanings: 1) the entity who is responsible for answering sink issued queries (usually data aggregators) should not learn or estimate the actual value of either data items or queries. 2) the integrity of query results should be assured. The former is usually addressed by encryption mechanisms, while the latter task can be accomplished by means of watermarking methods similar to the secure data aggregation solutions. However, none of the presented watermarking schemes for secure data aggregation can be used directly for the secure query processing [87] . The reason is that those techniques require all data or a large window of data for watermark verification, whereas the secure query processing requires a small part of all data items that are not necessary equal to the window length used for watermark encoding.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one work recently proposed by Yi et al. [87] that addresses the query integrity preservation by means of watermarking. For this purpose, both data items and queries are encoded using an order preserving function, and then the integrity verification of queries is achieved by a chain watermarking scheme that embedded the watermark of each data item into its predecessor. The presented protocol only targets range query type in two-tiered sensor networks. We envision the possibility of digital watermarking techniques for marking more sophisticated queries in sensor networks such as median, consensus, quantile queries [76] that requires more investigation.
3) SECURE DATA PROVENANCE
Data provenance shows the history of data ownership and is crucial for assurance of data trustworthiness. Again, there are many techniques such as signatures, message authentication codes, file headers to associate provenance information with data. Chong et al. [1] designed the first watermarking system for embedding provenance information into sensory data including positive and negative integers, decimal numbers and also low-entropy datasets. For this purpose, provenance information is embedded into the insignificant bits of data items. The authors argued that blind watermarking schemes can be used in sensor networks for answering the question ''Where did the data come from'' whereas non-blind techniques can answer the question of ''Is this data mine?''. Later on, Sultana et al. [86] considered the problem of secure provenance transmission in a data streaming fashion. The presented method constructs an audit trail of data by embedding provenance information within inter-packet delays of consecutive packets from a sensor node over the routing tree.
One may argue that placing watermarks inside the metadata (timing information) is far from the purpose of watermarking in the sense that the best watermarking schemes are the ones that are not detachable from the host data. The missing point here is that meta-data could also be considered as host data. As an example, consider the Australian government law for retention policy of meta-data for the duration of at least two years [110] . For this scenario, it is required the audit log be protected from modification to permit detection and after-the-fact investigations of security violations and therefore watermarking could be useful to achieve this goal.
4) COVERT COMMUNICATION
A watermark can be the carrier of a covert message such as reporting misbehaving drivers in a Vehicle Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). The reason that we mention this application under the subcategory of sensor networks is that VANETs can use WSN technology for their communication infrastructure in order to facilitate route planning and route safety. This challenging environment requires novel solutions with respect to those of more-traditional wireless sensor networks though. For covertly reporting misbehaving vehicles within a VANET channel in real time, de Fuentes et al. [27] explored two information hiding techniques, namely a subliminal channel and a steganography method. As presented in this work, information hiding is a superior method to encryptions because an encrypted report sent after the illegal action could rise suspicious on the misbehaving vehicle.
The carrier for sending information is the VANET's beacon messages that are sent every 100 ms by all vehicles and contain the state of vehicles such as position, speed, heading, etc. Since this information is inherently noisy, there is a chance to hide information into the noise part. The subliminal channel embeds the report in the signature process (using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature algorithm) of beacon messages, whereas the steganography technique replaces the least significant bits of selected sensorial data fields. The hidden misbehavior report has three fields including misbehaving action, misbehaving vehicle identifier and also a random section that is only used for the subliminary-based approach. In both methods, the secrete message is encrypted with a password that is a particular permutation of the misbehaving vehicle identifier encrypted for a certification authority. Also by means of a redundancy encoding, both methods are robust against incidental data losses within the VANETs.
B. HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS
Today, medical data is often digitized and transmitted to information technology (IT) systems that facilitate diagnosis and treatments for patients. With the advent of cloud storage as a repository for storing, retrieving and exchanging information, hospitals and research laboratories could have instant access to many private and sensitive health records. The Public-Population-Project in Genomics (P3G) [42] and the Bimolecular Resources Research Infrastructure [41] are examples of biobank projects focusing on the circulation of biological information. Despite the achieved medical enhancements, information technology adoption in healthcare systems remains a concern: how to preserve privacy and security of sensitive and identifying medical information? In the following section, we look at the role of digital watermarking for improving security of healthcare systems.
1) BIOMEDICAL DATA WATERMARKING
Biomedical data such as Electrocardiogram (ECG), Electroencephalogram (EEG) and Electroretinogram (ERG) contain a number of sensitive attributes that need to be preserved from data tampering. Sutter in 1992 [28] originated the idea of using a SS watermark for ERG signals. In this work, pseudorandom sequences are used in creating image patterns such that when they are exposed to eye patients, there will be an electrical response in the retina that can be used for diagnosis purposes.
Kong and Feng [37] investigated the possibility of three different fragile watermarking techniques namely Patchwork, least-significant bit (LSB) substitution, and quantization index modulation (QIM) for integrity verification of ECGs and showed that the Patchwork method excelled over others in terms of noise resistance. A similar approach was devised by Engin et al. [38] using a discrete wavelet watermarking scheme for ensuring the security of the ECG signals , whereby authentication information is embedded in the Fourier coefficients of ECG segments. Kozat et al. [39] proposed the idea of fusioning sensitive metadata such Electronic Health Records (HER) within the medical data. For this purpose, one fragile watermark is embedded on top of a robust watermark to achieve the dual goals of privacy protection and tamper detection of ECG signals.
2) GENOMIC DATA WATERMARKING
Today, cutting edge research is being conducted at the intersection of the fields of digital watermarking, steganography and Genetics. Similar to a digital communication system, Deoxy-ribonucleic Acid (DNA) has emerged as a new carrier medium for hiding information, not only for the purpose of tagging and copyright protection of genomica data, but also for effective covert communications. Yet the same privacy issues of biomedical data exists. In this regard, channel errors are analogus to mutations of DNA bases [45] . DNA is conceptually equivalent to a quaternary finite-field sequence formed by four nucleotides (also called DNA bases): Adenine (A), Cytosine (C), Thymine (T), and Guanine (G). For example, the sequence AAGTCGATCGATCATCGATCATACGT respresents a 'DNA strand'. A DNA, thus, is composed of two oppositely oriented strands that join together by bonding between their four nucleotides.
Since, there are certain biological constraints in the structure of DNA segments it is not always possible to arbitrarily change a section of nucleotide sequences. One of such constraints is that in pairing between the two DNA strands, the nucleotide A bounds with T, and the nucleotide G bonds with C; therefore the paring A-T and C-G are the only possible bonds that could exist between the two strands.
The other constraint is related to the ability of watermark to surve genetic changes, in which the DNA sequence is altered permanently. These alterations, termed mutations may occur because of several facctors such as sunlight, DNA heredity, errors in the cellular machinery, etc.
Shimanovsky et al. [46] proposed the original idea of hiding information within DNAs. The authors claimed that their presented techniques not only can be used for integrity verification of DNA sequences, but also could be useful for gene copyright protection in the realms of gene therapy, transgenic crops, tissue cloning, and DNA computing. Juptier et al. [44] recognized wateramrking as a helpful tool for tracking the unauthorized use of genetically modified organisms . The proposed system uses unique watermarks to identify different laboratories and thus it would be possible to investigate whether a particular institution is the source of a viral outbreak such as the 2001 biotressorim-related anthrax attack.
One of the interesting challenges that we elabortae in Section IV, is the definition of invisbility and robustness for genomic data. For instance, Shimanovsky et al. [46] defined invisibility as preserving protein coding of the DNA after watermark insertion called amino-acid preservation. The data hiding method proposed for genomes of self-replicating living organism [43] , defined robsutness as the number of generations that the organism undergoes while the embedded information remains intact. Clearly the first refers to robustness of the host againt watermark alteration, whereas the second is robustness of the watermark against host alteration.
Authors in [44] identied the transparency to 'phenotype' of organism (phenotypic invisibility) and the robustness to genetic mutaions as important goals of a DNA watermarking scheme. The phenotype of an organism is the class to which that organism belongs and is determined by the description of the physical and behavioral characteristics of that organism suc as its size and shape, or its movment pattern.
The application of watermarking in healthcare systems can be extended to other types of genomic data such as those obtained from sexually reproducing organisms. The additional restriction here is that recombination of a watermarked X-chromosone with a watermarked Y-chromosone can destroy watermarks from one genertaion to the next and therefore watermarking of mitochondrial chromosome for those sexually reproducing organisms is advocated. Mitochondria reproduce asexually through the mother line, thus avoiding the recombination altogether. The authors in [49] have developed a program called Project Mito for creating mitochondrial watermarks.
For a comprehensive review of challenges and methods for DNA watermarking, readers are referred to [50] .
C. RELATIONAL DATABASES
The application of digital watermarking for relational data is obvious. Right protection, tamper detection, source identification, indexing and fast retrieval are typical examples of such watermarking usages. In this section, we only review VOLUME 4, 2016 a few recent works that introduced fancy applications of digital watermarking for relational databases.
1) DATA OBFUSCATION
Data obfuscation is a technique aiming at privacy-preserving mining of data usually by removing or replacing sensitive information from the original data [19] . For instance, it may be necessary to mask trajectories datasets before performing data mining operations to ensure the privacy of the users. The popular methods for data obfuscation include but not limited to data swapping, data randomization, data anonymization. Recently, Vlachos et al. [75] proposed a watermarking technique for trajectory datasets with double goals of right protection and data obfuscation. The proposed method guaranties preservation of hierarchical clustering operations after watermark insertion. This property is important for distance-based mining applications such as anomaly detection or classification. Since the watermark objective here is data obfuscation, the watermarks can be embedded with larger amplitudes as opposed to common usages in which the watermark is ought to be invisible. It is interesting to note that that the possibility of watermarking for code obfuscation as a defense against reverse engineering has been already discovered in software security literature. A good survey of watermarked-based obfuscation for software protection can be found here [47] .
2) FORENSIC CONSTRUCTION
Digital watermarking is a useful primitive for forensic construction. By forensic construction, we mean indexing information in a way that data alterations can be identified by an auditor. The idea of a watermark-based forensic construction for memory-based data structures was studied by Goodrich et al. [22] . In this work, forensic constructions for several data structures including binary search trees, skip lists, linked lists and hash tables is suggested. The proposed method encodes information into the layout of the data structure rather than data itself. The encoded information is a matrix contains the hash values of a concatenation of a subset of items in the given data structure. In contrast to storing hash values for authenticating data, this method requires no additional space other than a cryptographic master key for auditors.
Protecting disk-based data structures are more challenging compared to memory-based counterparts. This is so because the memory-based data could be attacked only during the execution time, whereas the disk-based data can be attacked offline as well [20] . As such, Kamel advocated the importance of watermarking of not only relational tables, but also all various relevant indexes. In particular, a forensic construction for R-tree data structures is proposed. One might be interested to use digital signatures for a R-tree. We argue that if the digital signature is applied to the whole R-tree, the changes to individual values cannot be localized In contrast, appending a separate signature to every node is not practical due to large required storage and it incurs performance penalty.
The presented forensic construction encodes the information within the order of entries inside the R-tree nodes relative to a secret key that corresponds to the watermark values. Furthermore, a factorial numbering system is used to provide mapping between possible permutations of the entries in R-tree and all possible values of the watermark.
D. CLOUD COMPUTING
In recent years, cloud computing has emerged as one of the most promising computing paradigms. Cloud users obtain storage and computing resources from cloud providers on demand, without local hardware and software maintenance burden. Despite all its benefits, there are many 'cloud fears' that inhibit the adaptation of cloud services by cloud users. Privacy is the main critical issue for cloud users as they no longer have the physical possession of their data. Putting data in a multi-tenancy environment also makes it vulnerable to unauthorized changes and might result in significant loss for individuals and organizations. Hence, security against unauthorized accesses and privacy preservation has been a long-term goal of the cloud security research community; many of them aim at shifting trust from a cloud provider to another third-party though [30] . Digital watermarking cannot solve all of these problems alone, but it could be useful in augmenting trust and security when combined with other security approaches.
1) SECURE DATA OUTSOURCING
The 'information-centric' security [30] advocates shifting data protection from the outside to within; this means that for controlling data in the cloud, data itself needs to be self-describing, and defending regardless of its environment. Therefore, cloud users need to have their own manual procedures for auditing outsourced data.
Bertino et al. [29] addressed two important issues pertain to sharing medical data including privacy protection of individuals associated with the data and copyright protection over the private data. Thereby, the authors proposed a framework with two main components i.e. binning agent and watermark agent. Before outsourcing, medical data undergo two consecutive steps; the binning agent firstly bins the data to satisfy k-anonymity specification and secondly the watermark agent inserts watermark information in a hierarchical manner. Lately, Soltani Panah and van Schyndel [36] described an efficient watermark-based system for private data auditing; instead of delegating the task of data evaluation to a trusted third party, the proposed watermarking method verifies the trustworthiness of data whose storage and handling is outsourced to the cloud, by the entity/person that knows the embedded values.
Wang et al. [94] described a compressive sensing-based framework for secure watermark detection using a multiparty computation protocol. Compressive sensing (CS) is an alternative to Shannon sampling theory for the reconstruction of a sparse signal whose sampling rate is far less than twice the maximum frequency present in the signal. Unlike the common assumption of publicly availability of watermarked data at the time of detection, the authors considered a scenario when the privacy preservation of watermarked data is also essential and therefore the watermarked data is only available in other formats such as encrypted data or CS-transformed data. In the proposed framework, the cloud not only supplies storage for outsourcing data in CS form, but also provides watermark detection service in the CS domain. Therefore, a certificate authority entity is involved to issue a CS matrix to the data owner in order to transform data before transmitting to the cloud. For secure watermark detection, the CS-watermark is sent to the cloud for verification. The proposed framework is specifically useful for a scenario whereby a cloud provider is willing to provide storage to only copyright protected content from one hand and the cloud user, on the other hand, transforms his data before outsourcing for the sake of privacy.
2) DATA COLORING BY CLOUD WATERMARKING
Data coloring is a digital watermarking technique based on Cloud model, which assigns each user a specific color for protection of copyrighted materials. Color is used as a metaphor, referring to watermarking of all pieces of user's data. That is to say, not only the whole data but also a fragment of that data is branded [31] . This is similar to digital holographic watermarking methods, whereby part of hologram can be used to decode the hidden information in order to increase the processing speed. An example is [33] .
Cloud model is an uncertainty transforming model between a qualitative concept and its numerical representation. Broadly speaking, it associates a qualitative concept with three numerical parameters namely expected value (Ex), entropy (En) and hyper entropy (He) to represent the overall property of cloud drops. Using a forward cloud generator, a piece of cloud is made from a large number of cloud drops that has a visible shape in a whole, but fuzzy in detail. The forward cloud generator constructs cloud drops based on the three numerical parameters.
The idea of using cloud model for digital watermarking was first introduced by Zhang et al. [34] for copy right protection of relational databases and later on was extend by Liu et al. [31] for trust management in cloud-computing environments. In a cloud watermarking approach, given certain watermark information as expected value and other suitable parameters, a series of similar but different cloud drops are generated by the forward cloud generator in a way that a large number of randomly generated drops guarantee the certainty of a watermark. On the other hand, the watermark detection algorithm uses the backward cloud generator to retrieve Ex, En, and He from the construed cloud.
Similarly Hwang and Li [35] advocated a security-aware cloud architecture to implement a reputation system between service providers and data owners. The architecture uses trust negotiation enhanced with the data coloring technique to support the cloud service provider's perspective, while the cloud service consumer's perspective is supported using the distributed-hash-table (DHT)-based trust-overlay networks among multiple data centers to deploy a reputation-based trust management. Data coloring is applied for software files or at data object level for segregating user access and protecting sensitive information from provider access. To provide 'data protection a service', virtual storages supports color generation, color embedding and color-matching to associate a colored data object with its owner.
E. NETWORK FLOW WATERMARKING
In spite of all the good usages of watermarking techniques that have been described so far, there exist other watermarking applications with obverse intentions such as breaking the anonymity of a communication. Anonymous communication systems like Anonymizer.com, attempt to remove all the identifying characteristics from the network flow to provide communication privacy beyond the content privacy. In such systems, an adversary might perform traffic analysis to disturb anonymity and finding communication relationships. Watermarking techniques are useful tools for linking network flows mainly because they can significantly reduce the computation and communication costs of traffic analysis with more accurate detection rates.
One of such attempts is proposed by Wang et al. [89] that can uniquely identify a long flow by injecting a unique watermark into the inter-packet timing of a packet flow. Their method could successfully penetrate the Total Net Shield anonymous service with only 10 minutes active Web browsing. Later on, two other similar watermarking systems proposed namely RAINBOW [90] and SWIRL [91] . Both systems actively modify the traffic patterns of a network flow (usually packet timings) to contain a special pattern. If the same pattern is later found on another flow, the two are considered linked. In a recent research, Bates et al. [32] demonstrated a network-flow watermarking attack for identifying virtual machines co-located on the same physical resource. For this purpose, a malicious user is able to embed a watermark into the network flow of a target instance and broadcast co-residency data from that physical machine in order to compromise co-residence isolation in virtualization middleware, under 10 seconds traffic analysis.
Apart from attacking anonymous communications, digital watermarking can be beneficial for detecting stepping stones [93] . Such methods direct network connections from an attacker to a victim through a number of compromised hosts in order to hide the attacker identity. Detecting such hosts, called stepping stones, is therefore an important problem in computer security in order to trace attacks back to their true sources. Recently information hiding has been coupled with the IP spoofing to combat Internet censorship [94] . The proposed framework called CensorSpoofer, tunnels data over existing protocols such that a low-capacity email channel is used for upstream messages and a high-capacity VoIP channel is utilized for downstream. In other words, upstream channel hides the requests using steganography within email/IM whereas the downstream channel uses IP spoofing to conceal the proxy's real address.
F. FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
The application of information hiding techniques in financial systems is evolving and still requires more attentions from academia. The reason might be the high sensitivity level of information in financial applications and difficulty of finding a security solution on a cost effective basis. Nonetheless, there are few works in this area that are worth mentioning. One of the interesting applications of watermarking has appeared with the advent of the first decentralized electronic currency system called Bitcoin [107] . This system uses a powerful scripting mechanism to determine tokens ownership. The proposed Colored coins [108] or watermarked tokens allow users to watermark their Bitcoins. Additionally, these colored coins extend the ability of biotins to represent other assets such as car, smartphone, stock, and so forth such that they can be tracked on the Bitcoin blockchain.
The other application of information hiding techniques in financial systems that is still in infancy is money-laundering detection. Leigh [109] investigated the possibility of covert channels in financial networks for money laundering. Consider the scenario where Bob is part of a money laundry network and runs a legitimate business such as a retail shop. Bob's supplier pays him inflated prices for buying merchandise as a common customer. If we assume the payment is done via direct credit or wire transfer, Bob could use the cent values of the bank transfer to indicate the next person who the money should be passed; for example, amount ending with 01 cents are transferred to Alice, 02 to Claire, and so on. This way a covert channel for money laundry is provided.
The author developed a framework for testing data hiding in electronic funds transfer systems with direct debit transactions in use within. The conclusion was that steganography analysis could be used for detecting the presence of hidden data in financial covert channels (referred to anti-money laundering), whereas digital watermarking techniques are useful for tracing suspect transactions and possibly determining the degree of separation between suspects. We also envision the possibility of covert channels for new digital currencies such as Bitcoin credit.
IV. NON-MEDIA WATERMARKING TAXONOMY
In this section we have a detailed look of digital watermarking techniques for the mentioned complex data in section I.A. All the presented methods are analyzed regarding to the four main watermarking properties.
A. TIME-SERIES
Time series data is perhaps the most frequently encountered type of data used by the data mining community. Given a one dimensional (1d) time-series of length n, it can be represented by an ordered set of n numeric values at each timestamp t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n . This definition is compatible with a discrete time-series contains a finite set of values. In contrast, a continues time-series contains an unbounded stream of data values, and therefore a window is introduced to extract finite portions of the stream. Since there are overlaps between timeseries data and time-series data streams, we only review few watermarking techniques for time-series medical data in particular ECG time-series and shall then look at the others when explaining the data-streams type. The general procedure for watermarking of ECG data is demonstrated at Fig. 4 . [39] proposed the idea of fusioning sensitive numerical metadata (such as patient's social security number or date of birth) within time-series in particular ECGs. For this purpose, a combination of a robust and a fragile watermark is embedded within an ECG signal. The robust watermark is a SS modulated watermark embedded in the frequency domain for storing patient data. The host ECG is thus partitioned into a set of overlapping subsequences, and for each of these sub-ECGs the same watermark is spread over many frequencies so that the energy in any subsequence is very small and minimally detectable. The fragile watermark is added on top of the resulting signal contains the robust watermark for identifying possible tampering of the host data based on the LSB alteration method of selected positions of the host data to make it resilient against estimation attack.
1) Kozat et al.
In order to preserve privacy of private metadata, a randomized representation of the metadata is generated by a cryptographically safe hash function. Then, the resulted hash value is enclosed with an error correcting code (such as Hamming codes) for aiding data recovery in the case of data corruption. In order to determine the watermark embedding power, a cardiologist examined a random subset of watermarked normal and arrhythmia ECGs to identify the diagnostic values and based on the observations, it is claimed that for SNR < 30dB the diagnostic do not change significantly.
Watermarking Properties: In many heart investigations, the purpose is to classify heart beat signals as normal or abnormal (arrhythmia). Therefore, a watermarking scheme for ECG should not compromise this task. The presented method is imperceptible to ECG features and hence does not change the cardiovascular diagnosis of a physician. The watermark capacity for an ECG segment of size 168 is 30-bit long binary stream (equivalent to a 9 digit numerical Social Security Number) or 56 bits including Hamming code (7, 4) . The robust watermark is resilient against vertical shifts, decimation attack, cropping attack, and noise addition in both space and frequency domain. The secrecy of the scheme is tightly dependent on the knowledge of a secret key vector θ = [κβ] where κ is randomly selected from the key space (secrete seed for the computing hash value of metadata) and β is a data-dependent secret without any correlation with the watermark (and is calculated before watermarking process). Therefore disclosure of the secret key vector does not reveal any information about secrete meta-data embedded within the ECG signal.
2) Similarly, Soltani Panah and van Schyndel presented a high capacity low complexity watermarking scheme for ECG signals [36] . Given an ECG segment, a time-based sliding window is employed to find the local minimum and maximum data values in the current window to preserve those values during watermark insertion. The method selects multiple continues bit-planes for embedding watermark bits. Then the host data is masked with selected biplanes and combined with a hash value of a secret key using an exclusive OR operation. This makes the watermark dependent to the data and more resilient to copy attack. The output is then XORed with a binary logo and the result is substituted with bit-planes of the scaled ECG. The presented method has the advantage to detect and accurately localize degraded data and could rapidly recover after data loss. It is also possible to embed other data such patient health records or a CDMA-encoding binary message to achieve synchronization with no extra effort on the part of a data encoder.
Watermarking Properties: The embedded watermark is invisible to diagnosis because any significant local minima/maxima will remain after embedding and the position of such maxima is unchanged by design. Hence PQRSTUV features of ECGs are maintained in terms of timing. By adapting the window size to be close to detector resolution, the proposed method does not change the peak heights significantly either. Therefore, the PQRSTUV points are completely recoverable within sensor resolution and as a result the diagnostic significant is relatively unaffected and is limited by PRD. Additionally, the amount of information can be embedded inside an ECG with analog to digital converter resolution of 11 bits and sampling rate of 360 Htz is roughly 1.8 Kbits/sec. The robustness of the scheme is evaluated against signal modification (watermark graceful degradation) and deletion. It is shown that deletions and additions will cause synchronization loss for the remainder of an ECG segment, but for the rest of ECG, the synchrony is later reestablished via the protocol. Also, the secrecy of the embedded information is enhanced by adding the hash value of a secret key.
B. BIOLOGICAL SEQUENCES
In contrast to the time-series, biological sequences such as DNAs do not refer to time explicitly, but the ordering of such data provides information about the data characteristics.
Typically, there are two parts for embedding information within DNA namely coding and non-coding segments. A noncoding DNA (nc-DNA) segment is never translated to a protein, whereas a coding DNA (c-DNA) may be translated into a protein eventually [45] . Similar to multimedia watermarking that prefers to embed watermarks within active parts of the host data rather than headers or trailers to achieve maximum robustness, the strongest watermarking techniques for DNAs hide information in the actual sequence coding of the genes rather than noncoding parts [46] . The challenge is therefore how to preserve the important protein coding of the genes. This feature is referred to 'amino-acid preservation' in the DNA watermarking literature. Fig.5 shows an example of embedding information within a c-DNA segment. In the following, we review a few of important data hiding techniques for this type of data. [106] . For instance, according to the codon table, the two codons 'GTG' and 'GTT' result in the same amino acid Val. Therefore, they can be interchangeably used for watermark insertion. [46] proposed two data hiding techniques with the purpose of tagging and integrity verification of important genetic materials. The first technique hides data within non-coding DNA or non-translated RNA regions, while the second method hides data directly into active genetic segments. The basic idea of the two techniques is based on DNA codon redundancy. A codon is a grouping of three nucleotides. There are 4 3 different codon combinations with a triplet nucleotide of an RNA, whereas there are only 20 standard amino acids. Hence, each amino acid can be encoded by more than one codon. For instance, the codons 'GCU', 'GCC', 'GCA', and 'GCG' encode the same amino acid known as Ala. If the codon 'GCU' is intended to be marked with a secrete message 4, it is replaced by 'GCG' because this is the fourth codon of the set of codons whose mapping amino acid is Ala.
1) Shimanovsky et al.
The embedding process is based on arithmetic coding technique: a binary sequence corresponds to the watermark message is first converted into a decimal number between 0 and 1. Then, for the amino acid sequence generated VOLUME 4, 2016 by the original mRNA, a list of all possible codons that result in the same amino acid is found. After that the number can be calculated by continually subdividing the number of codon combinations for each amino acid in the sequence. In order to prevent ambiguity, the subdivision process of the arithmetic encoding can be done in an alphabetical order. Curiously, this kind of code redundancy is similar to that used for software code watermarking [47] .
Watermarking Properties: Amino acid preservation is the main requirement for a DNA watermarking algorithm. The proposed scheme does not change the transcription or translation of a protein and therefore gives the identical amino acid sequence as that of the original DNA. The capacity of the scheme has not been investigated for a general case, but through an example, the authors have shown the ability of embedding 40 bits into a short mRNA sequence. The embedded message is encrypted prior to watermarking. Also, the authors have suggested using other arrangement technique rather than an alphabetical arrangement for nucleotide subdivision to prevent an attacker from repeating the same watermarking process. This implies the 'security-throughobscurity' assumption that we already discussed.
2) DNA-Crypt algorithm is a method that secretly marks a DNA sequence by using a combination of encryption and steganography techniques [48] . Encrypted messages are integrated into nc-DNA regions with the purpose of detecting unauthorized usage of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO). The method takes advantage of amino acid redundancy to replace single bases and thus creating 'synonymous codons' in the genome. More specifically, the DNA-Crypt allocates four bases {A, C, G, T} to 2 bits and embeds the last base of four synonymous codons into 2 bits of the watermark. In order to make the watermarks robust against DNA mutation, correcting codes such as Hamming-code are used to keep the information intact. An integrated fuzzy controller decides on a set of heuristics, whether to use a correction code or not for optimal performance based on three variables including length of the sequence, the individual mutation rate, and the stability over time (i.e. number of generations). Eventually, the resulted encrypted information is placed into the given DNA for long term storage. The proposed DNA-Crypt introduces only few sequence mismatch that is similar to noise in image steganography.
Watermarking Properties: Similar to the previous method, the proposed DNA-Crypt does not change the transcription or translation of a protein and therefore, the amino acid sequences are preserved after hiding information. Based on performed in silico exterminates on Ypt DNA proteins, the presented scheme could embed 16.5 bytes information within the DNA sequence. Additionally, it is resilient to mutations since several mutation error correcting codes are utilized for correcting hidden information. The DNA-Crypt algorithm, takes advantage of cryptographic algorithms such as AES, Blowfish, RSA keys, or the one-time pad to encrypt the binary watermark. Therefore, it is difficult to extract the watermark without knowledge of the key but it is not difficult to remove the watermark since the embedding position is easily predictable.
3) Later on, Heider et al. [49] investigated the possibility of DNA watermarking for sexually reproducing diploid organisms and developed an extended version of the DNA-Crypt, called Project Mito that embeds watermarks within Y-chromosomal/mitochondrial DNA (mt-DNA). The authors found that encoding information in sexually reproducing genomes is more complicated due to possibility of recombination of those genomes. Indeed, the survival of the watermarks after combination of a watermarked X-chromosomal and a watermarked Y-chromosomal depends on the 50% probability of inheriting the watermarked X chromosomal to the son. Hence, it is suggested to embed information within mt-DNA instead of X-chromosomal since mt-DNA is only inherited from the mother (only 0.1% paternally inherited) and therefore is ideal for permanent watermarking of sexually reproducing genoms.
Watermarking Properties: In terms of watermark properties, the invisibility, robustness, and security are almost the same as those of DNACrypt. The addition constraint here is that, the proposed scheme should be robust against recombination to preserve the watermark information intact from one generation to the next. In the performed in silico analysis on human mt-DNA, the maximum information capacity of 60 bits is achieved. 4) Liss et al. [52] presented a watermarking method that embeds ASCII-encoded messages within the open reading frames (ORFs) of synthetic genes in a way that does not interfere with 'codon optimization' of those genes. The codon optimization is a technique for enhancing gene expression in silico design often uses a distinct arrangement of codons to obtain an optimal translation rate without altering the amino acid sequence. The method first determines the frequency of each codon from the codon usage table of the host gene and then codons assignment is done in a way that mirrors the bit frequencies of the message. If two codons have the same frequency, they are sorted alphabetically. Finally, the encoded message is embedded into 4 or 6 synonymous codons that retain a high degree of codon assignment flexibility by having the choice between at least two codons in the design process.
Watermarking Properties: The presented scheme is imperceptible as there is no detectable loss of protein for optimized synthetic genes. With the aim of this method, one could store 150 bits or 25 characters within a protein of 300 amino acids successfully. It is possible to double data capacity by including 2 or 3 syndrome codons with the cost of changing the codon adaptation index and genetic code content. Furthermore, the presented method has decent robustness against mutation. For example, the embedded watermark in the ORF of a fast mutating human immunodeficiency virus remained intact after 136 days of virus replication. Finally, the codon usage table and ranking of alternative codons provide the key to decoding watermarks. 5) Shiu et al. [51] proposed three reversible DNA-based data hiding methods namely insertion method, the complementary pair method, and the substitution method. Despite previously discussed techniques, the objective is neither preserving intellectual property nor authentication of genome data, but the DNA data hiding is utilized as a fancy way of exchanging secret information through an unsecure channel such as a session key. For each method, a public DNA sequence is used as a reference, which implies the sender and receiver have to agree on the reference sequence. Since there are roughly 163 million publicly available DNA sequences, it is theoretically impossible for an attacker to guess the reference sequence.
The proposed algorithms are based on two secret schemes called a binary coding rule and a complementary coding rule that is only known to the sender and receiver. The former transforms letters into binary codes and vice versa such as mapping nucleotides A, C, G, T to 00, 01, 10, 11. The latter assigns each letter x to a complement letter C(x). For example, the complementary rule ((AC)(CG)(GT)(TA)) results in mapping the string of 'AATGC' to 'CCATG'. Apart from the good capacity, the three methods have a few disadvantages: the insertion method requires several keys be transmitted to the receiver; the complementary pair method expands the sequence length significantly; and the substitution method requires that the original DNA sequence be transmitted to the receiver for extracting the secret message. Among the three methods, the substitution method is more compact and effective compared to the other two methods.
Watermarking Properties: The transparency of the proposed methods are measured based on the reference DNA sequence's length after watermark insertion. The reason is that a long DNA sequence can easily attract the attention of intruders. The three methods suffer from the expansion problem; in particular, the expansion of the DNA sequence using the complementary pair method is larger than the expansions for the other two methods. The capacity of the three methods are found based on bits per nucleotide (bpn) that shows the number of bits hidden per character and is , and m s for insertion, complementary pairs, and substitution correspondingly where m is the length of the secrete message, s is the length of the DNA reference sequence, and k is the length of longest complementary pairs. Therefore, the substitution method has the best capacity while the complementary pairs has the worst capacity. In terms of robustness, the insertion method has the most resistance against modifications while the complementary offers the least robustness. Also the cracking probability of the three methods are ( . From a security point of view, the assumption of hidden binary and complementary coding rules from the public is against Kerckhoffs' principle for a secure watermarking system.
C. GRAPH-STRUCTURED DATA
Today much sensitive data are captured as large graphs like those obtained from social media Websites such as Facebook or Tweeter. The social data can be modeled as a graph G = (V , E), where people are analogues to the graph vertices V and their social ties corresponds to the graph edges E connecting those vertices. In spirit, the idea of many graph watermarking schemes is convolving a random looking graph with an original large enough dense graph. Fig. 6 represents this procedure at a glance. In Fig.6 (a) the marked part of the original graph (colored as red) shows the extracted subgraph whose edges are going to be added or deleted according to the watermark graph (Fig.6 (b) ). Apart from social network graphs, watermarking of semistructured data such as XMLs and software watermarking have similar graph structure model to that of social data and therefore, a few of the related works in this section are dedicated to them. In many software watermarking schemes, it is customary to add a set of additional constraints to a given problem, the intellectual property of which is desired in order to limit the choice of solutions. This method is called constraint-based watermarking [53] .
1) Qu and Potkonjak proposed a constraint-based watermarking method for intellectual protection of a graph coloring solution, whereby watermarks are encoded as extra constrains within the register allocation of an application [53] . A graph coloring problem aims at labeling the vertices of a graph with minimum number of colors such that no two connected vertices have the same color. In this work, the graph coloring problem is modeled as a random graph of n vertices with edge probability p denoted as G n,p (V , E), and then three watermarking methods are described for embedding the message M into a k-color solution.
The first technique adds extra edges between a set of pairs of vertices according to the binary encryption of M and forces those vertices to have different colors. The second technique selects one or more subsets S ⊂ V according to the message M and assigns each subset with one color and then color the rest of the graph. The selected subset(s), called maximal independent set (MIS), are selected in a way that none of the vertices in S are connected to each other, while all other vertices not in S are connected to at least one of vertices of S. The third method adds new vertices and associates edges based on the watermark M to the original graph G. All the presented methods enjoy high credibility, meaning VOLUME 4, 2016 that the watermark signatures are easily detectable with low probability of coincidence for the proof of ownership. Among the three methods, the MIS technique has the least watermark information capacity.
Watermarking Properties: The watermark invisibility is evaluated based on the quality of coloring solution after watermark insertion. For this purpose, the number of colors after hiding watermark signatures is compared to that of original solution (k). It is shown the three methods provide high credibility with at most one-color overhead even for large graphs. Additionally, the maximum watermark capacity for the three methods are n, log 2 n log b n, and 2n bits correspondingly, where b = 1/1 − p. There is no discussion on the robustness and security of the scheme apart from the secrecy of the watermark message that is achieved by encryption or cryptographic hash functions.
2) Similar to watermarking of the graph coloring solutions, Wolfe et al. [54] proposed several watermarking techniques for right protection of graph partitioning (GP) solutions, which is the problem of dividing the vertices of a graph into disjoints sets of specified sizes such that number of edges among those sets is minimized. The performance of a GP solution is often measured by the weight summation of the edges that are being cut by the partitioning algorithm, named 'edge-cut' metric. Therefore, the proposed scheme attempts in minimizing the edge-cut value, while strengthening the watermark proof of authorship. The key idea is then, mapping the signature into a set of sufficiently randomized constraints and adding those constraints to the instances of the GP. This is done by various methods including merging random pairs of vertices, adding edges between random pairs of vertices, merging random edges, thickening random edges, and dropping random edges.
Watermarking Properties: The watermarking techniques are completely transparent to the computer-aided design (CAD) synthesis tools which perform the graph partitioning task. Also, the methods are resilient against brute force attacks in which an adversary embeds a fake signature (or ghost signature). In order to select random vertices/edges a, 'canonical' ordering of the vertices/edges is used based on a PNRG seeded by the signature. Unless the relationship between the signature and the canonical ordering is established, one can claim that the signature (encrypted with his/her RSA private key) is actually embedded.
3) Khanna and Zane [55] studied watermarking of weighted graphs that are generated from map data in order to detect pirate copies on the basis of queries alone, referred as query-preserving watermarking. The hypothesis is that data is partially accessible through a set of queries. For example, a suspected database provided by an unknown server can only be examined based on queries' results.
The proposed scheme encodes information in the weights of the graph representing the map, such that the length of any shortest path is not modified beyond an acceptable and provable distortion d. Additionally, a general probabilistic method is proposed to mark graphs in an adversarial setting, where the malicious data provider tries to erase the watermark by introducing distortions to query results. For this purpose, the original graph G is associated with a vector X that includes the correct answers to the queries. The marked copy of the vector X denoted as Y is then constructed form a random vector B such that Y (i) = X (i) + a mid + a diff B(i) represents the correct answers in the marked graph, where a mid = a 1 +a 2 2
and a diff = a 2 −a 1 2 for a pair of distinct values a 1 , a 2 ∈ {0, +1, −1}. Thereby, if the owner constructs the vector Z based on queries' results of the suspected data, the provider is responsible for the suspected copy, if
Watermarking Properties: The watermark invisibility of the presented scheme is equivalent to preserving the shortest path lengths for each pair of nodes in the marked graph. The watermark capacity is investigated for 3 different queries namely edge, distance, and route queries in both nonadversarial and adversarial setting. For a graph G with n nodes and m edges, it is possible to encode O(m 1/2−1/d ) bits of information for the edge model and O(n 1/2−1/d ) for distance model with an additive distortion of 1/d(0 < d < 1/2) in both adversarial and non-adversarial settings. There is no direct discussion about robustness and security of the scheme. However, the adversarial setting can be considered as the robustness against deliberate attacks as the provider distorts queries by a bounded value in order to evade the fingerprint. Also the presented scheme is based on the assumption that the (suspected) data provider has limited knowledge about the graph, which may limit the suitability of the method in some severe circumstances where the malicious provider has gained access to the true distances. 4) Sion et al. [56] investigated watermarking of structured aggregates of multiple types of contents such as XML documents or complex Web content. In this work, the aggregated content is represented as a graph of size n and characterized by values lying both in the structure and individual nodes. Before marking the graph, a resilient labeling method is utilized to uniquely identifying nodes based on the dual nature of semi-structures: the node content is used to construct a gracefully degradation summary for that node and, the topology structure is used to determine the node position in the entire graph. The actual label of a node is defined by an interval to ensure labeling of a modified version of the graph preserves the node label's interval with a high probability.
The labeling process is initialized with keyed summary values and constructs labels over a number of iterations in such a way that the number of overlapping label intervals is minimized. Then, the watermark encoding process makes use of the constructed labels to insert one-bit watermark information within each node in a secret fashion: for each node j and its corresponding interval (x, y) j , if (msb j ⊕k j )mod e = 0, then it is marked with the XOR value between the LSB of its randomly generated key k j and the corresponding watermarking bits. The notation e shows the percentage of selected nodes for watermark insertion and msb j = msb (x, b) where b is the maximum number of most significant bits in the number of intervals such that ∀(x, y) j msb (x, b) = msb(y, b). Watermark decoding involves identifying watermarked nodes and then applying content-specific watermark detection to each node in order to retrieve watermark bits.
Watermarking Properties: Transparency of the watermarking method for XML documents means structural equivalence and preserving higher level semantics after watermark insertion. The data-carrying capacity is tightly related to both constructed graph and the content of composing nodes. The presented scheme has the average guaranteed bandwidth of n/e bits of information. The labeling process is robust against a number of graph attacks knows as 'surgeries' such as elimination of value-insignificant nodes or elimination of inter-node relations. The security of the scheme is based on secret parameters including content summary key, number of performed iterations in labeling algorithm, and n (b-bits) keys k 1 , . . . , k n used for content-watermarking technique. The authors have argued the possibility of using the same key for all nodes that deters inter-node collision attacks if the same node content is watermarked with different keys.
5) Gross-Amblard studied the capacity of watermarking protocols that preserve a set of predefined queries [57] . He showed that for a scalable watermarking protocol, marks should be hidden into weights of active tuples of the dataset, that is those tuples that are part of query answers. In particular, a watermarking protocol for preserving Monadic Second-Order (MSO) queries on treelike structures such as XMLs and classes of structures with bounded cliquewidth or tree-width is suggested. MSO is a node selection query language for XML documents with a more expressive form than XPath. For every MSO query, there exists an automaton which defines the equivalent query. Hence, it is possible to compile a MSQ formula into the correspondence tree automation augmented with m selecting states in order to evaluate the MSO query. For watermark insertion, the constructed automation tree is fully traversed in a bottom-up order to form |W | 4m subsets of size at least 2m and at most 4m, where |W | is the size of active tuples. Then, for each set a pair of nodes that force the automation to end is searched and marked to control the overall distortion.
Watermarking Properties: The watermarking scheme does not change the first-order and MSO queries' results up to an acceptable distortion, and therefore is transparent to those queries performed on treelike structures. Following the nonadversarial model, it is possible to embed |W |/4m information such that MSO query results are preserved. For the adversarial model, one can embed O(L) bits with a detector's error probability at most max{2p, O(1)}, given L = |W |/2 and p ≥ e −O(L) . Also, the presented scheme is robust against random distortion of query answers (adversarial setting). 6) Zhao et al. [58] proposed a method of in-band watermark insertion for privacy preservation of shared graphs among multiple parties. A watermark W i is a small tailormade graph generated from a graph G of n nodes, a graph key only known to data owner and a key known to a user (party) whom the marked graph is shared with. The watermark W i is a random graph (generated based on the Erdos-Renyi model in which the degrees distribution follows a Poisson distribution) with node count k such that each of the k 2 edges is added to the W i independently with the probability p. Then a subgraph S ⊂ G is extracted from the original graph and the W i graph is overlaid with S. The underlying requirement for the proposed solution is that the original graph degree and also subgraph density should be comparable or even higher than the generated watermark subgraph.
To reinforce watermark uniqueness, a hash-based labeling scheme is proposed such that for each node, a hash value is constructed from the array of its neighbor degrees called node structure description (NSD). For example, for a node v with three neighbors of degrees 2, 4, and 6, its NSD is ''2-4-6''. This way, k hash values are randomly generated as node indexes of the sub-graph S. Finally, S is modified to match the watermark W i using an XOR operation on its edge values. This results in a unique watermark graph G W i constructed for user i using seed value i (associated with the user key and the graph key). The challenging part of the watermark extraction is related to identifying the existence of a subgraph in an arbitrary large test graph. This problem is called 'subgraph marching'' in graph literature and known to be NP-complete. Authors avoid this pitfall by pruning the search space into a small number of selected nodes.
Watermarking Properties: For a graph dataset, watermark insertion should not change overall structure of the graph. Therefore, three methods are proposed to measure graph distortions: 1) counting number of modified nodes and edges, 2) calculating Euclidean distance between the dK-2 deviations (joint degree distributions) of original and marked graph, and 3) measuring standard graph metrics including degree distribution, assortativity, clustering coefficient, average path length and diameter. The watermark capacity is not investigated thoroughly, but it has been noted that, the watermark graph requires average node degree of (k + 1)/2 and average graph density of
to ensure watermark uniqueness and minimum distortion.
Watermark robustness is evaluated based on both single and collusion attack model and a hierarchical watermark embedding process is suggested to countermeasures collusion attack as well. From a security perspective, the user key and the graph are required for watermark detection. Also the secure one-way hash function used for indexing nodes based on NSD-hashs at watermark placement step enhances the security of the scheme. The seed value i used for hash calculation is generated based on the following protocol: first the system sends a timestamp T to the user i. This user encrypts T by his/her private key and sends it to the system. The system, then decrypts the received message by user i's public key and combines the graph key and the user private key to form the random seed, if the decrypted timestamp is valid.
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7) The problem of software watermarking is inserting some data into a program, thereby protecting it against intellectual property theft. For example, one can embed a bogus code segment into a program for which the topology of its flow graph encodes a watermark. Even though the data type here is not a graph, but the program can be represented by a control/data flow graph and then the software watermarking becomes a graph watermarking problem. Recently, Chroni and Nikolopoulos proposed a software watermarking method that encodes an integer as a self-inverting permutation into a reducible flow graphs obtained from a program [59] . A permutation of a set is an arrangement of its objects in a particular order. For example, the permutation π 1 = (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 1, 4, 8) represent the arragenemnet of numbers over the set N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 9} such that 1 goes to 2, 2 goes to 3, 3 goes to 4 and so forth. In permutation terms, π 1 has a 5-cycle of the form C = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ) that maps each number to the next one on the list. A self-inverting permutation is a permutation with cycles of length 1 or 2. For instance, π 2 = (5, 6, 9, 8, 1, 2, 7, 4, 3) is a self-inverting permutation with cycles (1, 5), (2, 6) , (3, 9) , (4, 8) and (7).
The presented codec system takes an integer w as an input, converts it into a self-inverting permutation π * . Then a maxheap tree corresponds to that permutation is constructed in such a way that the cycles of the permutation π * are persevered. This heap is called C-Heap-ordered tree denoted by CH [π * ]. Finally, a directed graph F[π * ] is generated by exploiting the child-parent relation of the nodes in the CH [π * ]. Contrariwise, the decoding algorithm deletes the direct edges on F[π * ] and flips the remaining edges of the graph to construct CH [π * ]. Then a depth first search traverses the terminal nodes of CH [π * ] to extract the encoded permutation. It is interesting to note that the watermark graph can be constructed by min-heap representation of the self-inverting permutation as well. Therefore, one could encode the same watermark into two different graphs (one constructed from the max-heap and one from the min-heap) and thus increase the resilience against attacks.
Watermarking Properties: With the aid of the presented scheme one can encode n bits of information, where n is the binary representation of the given integer watermark w. Even though the presented scheme is efficient with respect to time and memory requirements, the watermarking properties of the presented scheme are not discussed (apart from increasing the robustness against attacks by multiple encoding).
D. SPATIAL DATA
Spatial data usually presents d non-spatial attributes for one or more spatial locations. The location attributes could be defined based on spatial coordinates such as latitude or longitude or in terms of logical locations in a map such as the city or state. The most striking types of spatial data include point, polyline, polygon, and grid [60] . The first three follow a vector data model while the last one is a raster model representing continues surfaces. In the following section, we review examples of such spatial data models.
The key part of the majority of the presented schemes for watermarking maps is feature selection, in which the most resilient features of a given map are extracted in order to survive map transformations and other attacks that attempt in impairing the embedded watermark. For example, in [65] authors used a Voronoi diagram for extracting the key points of a map from multiple layers. The key points are defined as those points in the map that have more important geometric and/or attribute aspects than the other points. Removing or editing the key points (such as joint points of a polygon) by an adversary is less probable as it makes the map useless. Fig.7 shows some of the feature selection algorithms that we review in this subsection. 1) Gou and Wu proposed a data hiding method for inserting collusion-resistant fingerprints within curve features of a map [62] . The curve is first parameterized using the B-spline model and then a spread spectrum watermark is added to the x and y coordinates of the B-spline control points. These points constitute a compact collection of prominent features of the curve and are analogous to the perceptually significant components of a continues-tone image. After watermark insertion, the marked B-spline points are sampled to generate the watermarked curve as close as possible to the original one such that the B-spline modeling error is kept minimum. The watermark detection is based on a correlation test between the fingerprint and an estimate of the embedded watermark. The difficult part of detection is related to the control points retrieval, because the sample points set may not be available to the detector especially when the test curve undergoes a geometric transformation. For solving this problem an Iterative Alignment-Minimization (IAM) algorithm is developed which aims at aligning the test curve with the original one in order to estimate the correspondence between sample points with high precision.
Watermarking Properties: The proposed scheme is imperceptible as it does not change the geographical and/or visual meanings conveyed by the map. It is shown that the number of B-spline control points and the watermark strength are two important parameters for tuning watermark distortion, but also the watermark robustness. The presented method selects (n + 1) control points for carrying watermark bits. Since each control point has two coordinate values, the length of the fingerprint sequence is equal to 2(n + 1). The watermarking method has robustness against collision, cropping, geometric transformations, vector/raster-raster/vector conversions, printing-and-scanning attacks. For increasing the security of the scheme, fingerprints are generated by a PNRG with different keys for different users.
2) Doncel et al. [63] described a zero-bit multiplicative watermark for copyright protection of 2d vector graphics data such as polygons and proposed an optimal blind detector whose performance is superior to a traditional correlator. Since Fourier descriptors of a polygonal line are invariant to a number of geometrical transformations, they are selected to carry watermark information. Traditional watermarking schemes often use a correlator detector to estimate the watermark. As a matter of fact, the embedding rule for polygon lines is rarely additive and the Gaussian approximation is not valid for their Fourier coefficients magnitude. Instead, the authors observed that if we model the Fourier descriptors by a Rayleigh distribution under the assumption that those descriptors are independent random variables, the detector performance will be improved. Finally, the watermarking scheme is extended for multiple polygonal lines by means of distributing the watermark uniformly through the vector graphic file. In particular, when two lines share a number of points (such as shared boarders of neighboring countries), they must be kept coincident at the corresponding locations (for retaining common boarders) after watermark insertion. Subsequently, the watermark detection for a set of polygon lines is achieved by combining the contribution of each polygonal line in a single Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) to reach a global decision result.
Watermarking Properties: The proposed method for marking vector graphic data should not cause any visual distortion after watermark insertion. The most delicate issue is watermarking of overlapping and adjacent lines as the distortion could convey false information such as changing the boarder divisions among countries on a map and therefore makes common boarders separate or vice verca. The proposed method can survive geometric distortions including translation, rotation, isotropic scaling and change of traversal starting point. Also it is sufficiently robustness to noise addition and anisotropic scaling attacks but is vulnerable to vertex removal attacks. As we mentioned, the method is a zero-bit scheme meaning that only the presence or absence of a watermark can be investigated. The watermark signal is generated by a PNRG seeded by a secret key. In the case of multiple lines, the same key is used for generating several watermarks because choosing a different watermark for each line would make detection difficult if lines were rearranged within the file.
3) Bird et al. [64] proposed a watermarking scheme for copyright protection of a vector map by inserting information into shapes of that map. A shape is defined as a polyline with a start and end point. In this work, the importance of invisibility constraint for vector maps and deficiency of adequate techniques for measuring the transparency of concealed information for non-human consumers is discussed. The presented method first scans a given map for shapes and then a watermark message is embedded for each shape. Based on the shape size, the message is split or replicated to fill the space. After encrypting the message and possibly appending a error correction code, it is converted into a perturbation code to be hidden in the original shape. Also, for locating the start of the hidden message, a 3-byte synchronization header is prepended to each message. The hidden method quantizes vertex coordinate values to form stego-shapes. Therefore, a stego-map is formed by randomly rotating its shapes with respect to the axis used for quantization.
The key part of the presented scheme is shape selection that impacts the information capacity; smaller shapes show small details allowing a long message or more redundant information to be embedded compared to longer shapes. One straightforward method of selecting shapes is based on finding short lines whose lengths are bellow a cut-off length, but this remains large areas of maps un-watermarked. To avoid this pitfall, a 'buffer-zone' algorithm is proposed that classifies line segments based on the median segment length parameter into buffer and non-buffer segments. Only the non-buffer segments are watermarked. The buffer size is selected large enough to avoid a short line becoming a long one and vice-versa if the map points move in the process of embedding the watermark.
Watermarking Properties: The authors stated that the watermark transparency definition for vector data is application-specific and often is not assessed by human vision. That is ''a watermark that perturbs a map below the level of tolerance used by that application would be invisible to it''. By design, the maximum data embedding capacity is 255 bits, because a single byte is allocated to the watermark message. The proposed scheme is robust against random noise attacks up to half of the strength of the watermark. Additionally, message security is achieved by encryption method and also appending an error correcting code to enhance reliability of the embedded message.
4) Yan et al. [65] proposed a watermarking scheme for copyright protection of vector geo-spatial data. To enhance the robustness against attacks, watermark information is embedded into three different feature layers of the geo-spatial data. The more important a layer is, the more likely the layer ought to be chosen. After selecting feature layers, the proposed method modifies the coordinates of some key points for each layer. The authors demonstrated several procedures for selecting key points from each type of layer (point, linear and areal) taking into account the specific attributes of those feature layers. For example, a Voronoi diagram is utilized for selecting key points in a specific point set. The watermark encoding process, converts a watermark string into an ASCII code and after shuffling and exerting a NOT bit operation, embeds the watermarks into the LSBs of the x or y coordinates of the selected key points.
Watermarking Properties: The watermarking method does not change the topological relations among spatial objects and therefore is invisible. It is possible to adjust the number of LSBs used for watermark embedding according to the required data precision for practical applications and make the watermark transparent to those applications. The watermarking scheme is robust against data format change, random noise, similarity data transformation, and data editing. The capacity of the watermark is not investigated, but it is mentioned that the number of points in each selected feature layer should be greater than the number of watermark bits to ensure the feasibility of watermark insertion. Similarly, there is no discussion about the security of the proposed method apart from the decision about the selection of feature layers and the number of key points for watermark insertion.
5) Wang et al. [66] presented a novel watermarking method for copyright protection of geographical data. Instead of embedding watermarks into vertices coordinates, the proposed scheme modifies spatial topological relation that exists among polygons in order to preserve their shapes after watermark insertion. To ensure synchronization between watermark encoder and decoder, minimum encasing rectangle (MER) of the geographical data is calculated. The MER is the rectangle of minimum area that completely encases the set of all vertices in the geographical data.
In order to identify polygons, the authors used Hilbert space-filling curve mapping, that is a common scheme for indexing geographic objects and could reduce the time of disks accesses. Therefore, polygon are organized in Hilbert order and assigned a unique Hilbert code (HC) based on the calculated MER. Then a set of polygon pairs are constructed in order to embed one watermark bit in every two polygons. For this purpose, a MAC is generated for every polygon based on the hash value of a secret key and the its HC After sorting all polygons according to their MAC values, every two polygons are selected as a polygon pair (P a , P b ) and one watermark bit is hidden into ξ least significant bit of the metric measure of spatial disjoint relation between the two polygons in a polygon pair. The metric measure is computed from a 9-intersection model that is a qualitative description of spatial topological relation between two point sets such as overlap, touch, disjoint, etc. By using this simple quantization method, only one polygon in each polygon pair is slightly scaled to derive marked geographical data.
Watermarking Properties: In the presented method, the polygon shape stays invariant after scaling that polygon and therefore the watermarking scheme is robust against geometrical transformation, object simplification, vertex interpolation, vertex reordering, and noise addition but not resilient to cropping attack. The proposed scheme has three secret parameters including (K s , K e , ξ ), where K s is the secret key used for computing polygons' MAC, K e is the secret key as the seed for the PRNG used in quantization modulation. Also, the sequence of number generated by the PRNG requires the knowledge of K e ||HC a ||HC b , where HC is the Hilbert Code for thr polygon pair (P a , P b ), and || represents concatenation. 6) Lee and Kwon proposed a blind watermarking scheme for a GIS vector by selecting layers with the highest density of polylines and polygons as target layers in order to improve the robustness against layer attacks [67] . The method clusters all polylines and polygons in the target layer of the map using a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) and embeds a watermark on the basis of distribution of polyline length and polygon area in each group by moving all vertices in polylines and polygons within a specified tolerance. In other words, an watermark W constitute a polygon watermark W PG embedded in all polygon groups and a polyline watermark W PL embedded in all polyline groups.
Watermarking Properties: The method is invisible as it does not cause any perceptual difference between the original layer and the watermarked layer of the map. However, based on the experiments, this difference is slightly visible when map is magnified three times. The watermark capacity depends on the map layers and number of polylines and polygons in the target layers. One requirement is that, the watermark length exceeds the
where N PL i and N PG i show the number of polylines and polygons in a layer, respectively. For example, in a 1:25,000 scaled map with 116 layers with 11,175 polylines and 7,765 polygons, the proposed method inserted 1719 watermarks successfully (1014 polyline and 705 polygon watermarks). The presented scheme is robust against rotation, scaling, translation, region and vertex cropping, data adding, random noise addition, polyline and polygon breaking, object filleting and simplification, layer rearranging, layer cutting. Additionally, average object number in a group and watermark length influence the watermark robustness and capacity and are inversely proportional.
7) Wang and Men [68] proposed a fragile watermarking scheme for authentication and tamper localization of 2d vector maps. Given a map with N polyline features, the proposed scheme divides the spatial features into D nonoverlapping groups of size n (D = N /n) based on unique recording numbers of features and then a watermark is embedded within each feature group by performing a difference expansion method. The authentication watermark is a group basis hash generated from two private keys that returns L bits from a string R in a random fashion. Also, for enhancing tamper localization accuracy, new vertices are interpolated to indicate the original location of each feature. The watermark verification consists of first identifying feature locations and then extracting group watermarks. The two drawbacks of the proposed method include unsuitability to apply for point features and inability to detect tampered regions -only tampered groups can be located.
Watermarking Properties: The invisibility of the method is assessed based on the vector map quality that is affected by the watermark length L and group size n. It is shown that decreasing L and increasing n values improve the watermarked map quality that is measured by the Root Mean Square (RMS) metric. The watermarking scheme is immune to vertex/feature modification, vertex addition/deletion and feature addition/deletion, feature rearrangement, vertex reversing. Security of the scheme is evaluated based on its resistance to brute force attack, preimage attack, and VQ counterfeiting attack. In order to perform a brute force attack, an adversary requires 2 C trials to find the valid key, C is the length of key pairs used in watermark generation,. For an effective preimage attack, a perfect forgery of a 2d vector map requires 2 L ×ln2 trails with a (1/2) probability. Therefore the ability of the proposed method to withstand these attacks depends on the key pair length for the brute force attack and watermark length for the preimage attack. The complexity of VQ attack is high and the presented scheme can resist this attack. 8) Wang et al. [69] presented a high capacity reversible data hiding method for 2d vector maps. For this purpose, the distance between the minimum and maximum coordinates of each axis are divided into equal segments and then two virtual coordinates are calculated for each coordinate according to the segment, which the coordinate is within. The new-formed intervals created by two virtual coordinates are modified to carry secret bits. In order to resist feature rearrangement and vertex traversing attacks, different vertex traversing orders are defined for different types of features. For example, within each polylines, vertices are sorted and traversed from the vertex with the biggest coordinate value (start vertex) to the vertex with the smallest vertex value (end vertex). Similarly, polylines are scanned from the polyline with the largest start vertex to the polyline with the smallest start vertex. Because vertex traversing order is essential for resisting feature rearrangement attacks, the start and end vertices are not used for watermark embedding.
Watermarking Properties: The watermark does not cause any significant visual distortion that is achieved by appropriately selecting the length of each interval created by two virtual coordinates. Apart from that, the presented method preserves the watermarked vertices within the original vertex range. If every coordinate carry c bits, the data capacity is about 2c times the number of vertices in the vector map. The robustness of the proposed method is low and is only immune to feature rearrangement and vertex reversing operations for polylines and polygons. There is no discussion about the security of the method apart from scrambling the secret watermark sequence according to a private key known to data owner.
E. SPATIOTEMPORAL DATA
A trajectory of a moving object is an example of a spatiotemporal sequence. Formally, a d-dimensional trajectory includes an ordered list of time-location pairs, i.e.
(t 1 , v 1 ) , . . . (t n , v n ), . . . where the pair (t i , v i ) denotes location information v i (of arity d) at time instance t i . In the case of arity 1, the trajectory is simply a time-series. Watermarking of trajectories is a challenging problem and depends on the characteristics of objects in the dataset such as variance.
For instance, a busy trajectory gives the opportunity to store more information whereas a very smooth line limits the watermark capacity [70] . The watermarking methods that we review in this section have particular interest in retaining the usability of dataset for mining algorithms. As such, these watermarking procedures are concerned with marking of a collection of objects while preserving the relationship among those objects, in contrast with the majority of the traditional watermarking schemes that consider only a single object. 1) Jin et al. [72] investigated the possibility of watermarking spatial trajectory databases. Two challenges are identified for watermarking of such dat. First, the redundancy of trajectories is rare compared to the multimedia data. Second, trajectories are not sensitive to spatial transformations as the meaning of whole data object (shape of movement) is far more important than the individual location values. This means watermarks that are dependent on certain bit values can be completely erased during spatial transformations without compromising the usability of trajectories. To avoid this problem, the authors proposed a watermarking solution by introducing small errors to trajectory shapes rather than data values. In other words, distance ratios relative to certain locations are chosen for embedding the bits of watermark information.
Assume T (n) is the location of a moving object on the n-th sample time. Given a parameter m as the percentage of locations to be marked, the location T (n) will be selected if hash (n • k) mod m = 0, where • stands for direct connection, and k is the private key known to the data owner. Then β bit of the distance ratio between the selected locations are watermarked. Detection process involves finding all watermark locations by having the private key (k) and the location order (n), and then β of the distance ratio is examined to find whether it is marked. If so, the location is marked as a support location. Finally, the ratio of the number of support locations to the number of watermarked locations i.e. match rate is compared with a threshold value to assert ownership by the person who provided the key. The proposed method could also be used for trajectory authentication to prevent illegal modification of the trajectories.
Watermarking Properties: In this work, imperceptibility is defined based on data usability after watermarking process which means the important features of spatial trajectories (motion shapes) should not be changed. For this purpose, one could use parameter β as tradeoff between error and watermark robustness: modification on the first few bits introduces larger errors on the trajectory data, whereas watermarking of the last few bits makes the scheme less robust to attacks. For the robustness, three types of attacks have been considered including scale attack, base location attack, and update attack. Based on the experiments, the proposed method could withstand these attacks with a relatively small cut-off ratio. From a security perspective, the watermarking algorithm is known to the public and the only secret information is the owner's private key (Kerckhoffs' principle).
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2) Lucchese et al. [70] proposed a novel watermarking scheme that preserves Nearest-Neighbors (NNs) of objects in a trajectory dataset. In other words, the k nearest neighbors of each object remains the same after watermark insertion and therefore the usability of dataset is preserved under NN-search and NN-classification. The heuristic approach here is modeling the watermarking problem with the NN constraint as an optimization problem and finding the largest watermarking strength for every pair of trajectories x and y in the dataset. The problem can, then be solved by counting the number of trajectories that lose their neighbors for any given watermarking strength through an exhaustive search (EH); however the high computational complexity of EH makes it inappropriate for large dataset. Therefore, a fast search algorithm is proposed for finding desirable embedding power that preserves NN of objects: first the squared distance between two watermarked trajectories is modeled with a piecewise quadratic function. Then, those ranges of embedding powers that results in distances lower than its original nearest neighbors are pruned from the search space. It has been proved that the proposed fast search algorithm results in the same embedding power as an exhaustive search algorithm.
The authors described two watermarking schemes including additive and multiplicative techniques based on frequency domain spread spectrum methodology. Both methods slightly modify coordinates of locations in trajectories from the second and up to the (l + 1)th Fourier descriptor where l is number of non-zero elements of watermark. Having a collection of watermarked trajectories, watermark detection is measured by calculating the average correlation across all sequences of the watermarked dataset. Finally, the authors have advocated the additive watermarking scheme with improved search detection for large trajectory dataset.
Watermarking Properties: The embedded watermarks do not introduce any apparent visual distortion on the trajectory shapes, but also preserve the NN of objects in the dataset under the Euclidean metric. Through the experiments, the data embedding capacity is evaluated by changing the watermark length from 1 to the trajectory length minus 1, since the first Fourier coefficient is not altered to avoid creating artifacts. Based on the results, it is possible to embed at least one bit in each frequency coefficient and keep the distortion small at the same time (SNR > 30 db). Also the scheme is robust against attacks including geometric transformations (translation, rotations, scaling), noise addition, down sampling, and up sampling.
3) Vlachos et al. [75] proposed a multiplicative watermarking scheme for spatiotemporal datasets with dual goals of right protection and data obfuscation. The proposed method is resilient against hierarchical clustering (HC) procedures, meaning that the resulting tree of partitioned objects, called dendrogram, after watermark insertion is isomorphic to that of the original data (Fig. 8) . For achieving this goal, the watermarking problem with HC constraint is casted as unobtrusively modifying the complete graph (constructed from the dataset) whose important parts after watermark insertion FIGURE 8. Demonstration of clustering preservation in terms of isomorphic dendrograms before and after watermark insertion [75] .
should be preserved. In this graph, nodes correspond to objects in the dataset and each edge between object x and y represents the Euclidean distance D(x, y) between them. After embedding watermark with power p into the Fourier descriptors of objects, D(x, y) will change to D p (x, y). The authors observed that there is a quadratic relation between the embedding power p and
where X j and Y j are j-th
Fourier descriptors and W j is the j-th watermark bit. Therefore, the HC preservation problem resorts to finding lower or upper envelops of this parabolas. The process to prune the search space follows the same steps as Lucche's et al. [70] scheme.
It is interesting to note that the watermark can be embedded with higher intensity, if the ultimate goal is data obfuscation. This may change the relationship between lower parts of the leaves in the clustering graph, but the higher parts that correspond to aggregated clusters are more likely to remain the same. The first step in watermark detection is removing the bias of average magnitudes of the Fourier descriptors across all objects and then correlation tests are performed and compared to a threshold whose value can be derived by a learning process to achieve a more robust detection.
Watermarking Properties: The proposed watermarking scheme does not introduce any visual distortion to trajectories. Also the encoding process does not affect none of the prevalent hierarchical clustering variants namely single-, complete-, and average-linkage. The presented method is robust against the following attacks: noise addition in space and frequency domain, up-sampling, down sampling, geometric transformation including rotation, translation, and scaling. From a security perspective, a secret key along with the bias average vector is considered as watermark keys. It has been assumed that the attacker the has knowledge of the watermarking algorithm but not the secret key(s) that is compatible with Kerckhoffs' principle. 4) Yue et al. [73] proposed a watermarking technique for right protection of trajectory streams. Unlike Lucchese's et al. method [70] that the entire dataset is assumed to be available for watermark encoding/decoding, the presented method is performed in an online fashion operating in a finite window, single pass streaming model. Additionally, the authors discussed the unsuitability of watermarking methods of other non-spatial streaming such as Sion et al.'s method [80] for trajectory streams. The deficiency of those methods is that they cannot survive common trajectory operations such as compression and trajectory segmentation. The former attempts in reducing data size and thus avoid raw data access and speed up queries. The latter is used to filter out subsets of trajectory locations for sub-trajectory mining purposes.
The presented watermarking method modifies distances between pairs of those feature locations that typically survive compression and segmentation. The feature locations are extracted by a Time Interpolated Feature Location Selection (TIFLS) algorithm. This algorithm utilizes a Synchronous Euclidian Distance (SED) metric as presented by Potamis et al. [74] for trajectory compression. This metric shows the distance between an observed position and its estimated positions via interpolation between its predecessor and successor points. For a time window of size ω, TIFLS selects a location that has the largest SED above than a given threshold as a feature location. Watermark detection includes recovering the feature locations gradually based on majority voting until it converges to the final watermarks. For example, in the experiments each watermark bit has received 60 votes on average to be detected.
Watermarking Properties: The invisibility of the scheme is evaluated based on data quality of watermarked trajectories which is measured by relative error ξ = T ||T −T w || ||T || where T and T w are the original and the corresponding watermarked trajectory. The presented scheme is able to embed about 7500 bits within taxi trajectories including 15 million locations of total distances 9 million kilometers. The proposed scheme is resilient to geometric transformation, noise addition, trajectory segmentation and compression. The watermark detection process requires 6 parameters namely watermark message, secret key, size of processing window, time window and threshold value used for feature selection in TIFS algorithm, and also bitwise position in distance between two consecutive feature locations. The first two are only know to data owner and the rest four could also be served as keys for watermark decoding. Also during the embedding process, a cryptographic hash function is used to enhance the security of the scheme.
F. DATA-STREAMS
A data stream is an infinitive sequence of data items that is generated by continues measurement over time. A window is often defined for bounding the amount of data items for processing. This type of data does not lend itself to signal processing-style watermarking methods and because it is unstructured, relational database watermarking techniques are not directly applicable [1] . This section is mainly dedicated to marking streaming data generated by sensor networks. The reason is that digital watermarking techniques have become a promising solution for such environments because of limited computational power and energy resources of sensors.
1) The problem of watermarking a single discrete stream of data such as sensory time-series was first addressed by Sion et al. [80] . In order to survive domain-specific attacks such as sampling and summarization, watermarks are encoded in important features of a streaming sequence i.e. areas of extreme. For this purpose, a window slides through the data stream to identify major extremes (local maximum values). Then based on some selection criteria, it is determined whether the identified extreme must be used for watermark embedding.
The deficiency of selecting extremes as watermarking carriers is that, an adversary could threat the watermarking scheme by simply randomizing bit positions. Therefore, a '-hash encoding' is used to determine the watermark positions: for a major extreme η, if Hash (msb (η, α), k 1 ) mod φ = i, then η is considered for embedding bit i of the watermark, where msb (η, α) denotes the α most significant bits of η, k 1 is a random number, and φ is a secret to limit the number of selected major extremes. Similarly, Hash((msb (η, α) , k 1 ) mod β is calculated to determine which of the lower β bits of η be modified to carry one bit watermark information. Watermark detection can be done in either on-the-fly streaming fashion or offline for a chunk of data. For this purpose, watermark is gradually reconstructed and verified by a majority voting approach that determines the most likely initial watermark bits.
Watermarking Properties: In this work, watermark invisibility corresponds to preservation of the host data quality such that the main statistical properties of the data stream including mean and standard deviation are preserved over the long term. The proposed scheme can survive re-sampling, summarization (defined as an average function), random changes and combined transformations. From a security point of view, for each extreme, the watermark location is determined based on the cryptographic one-way hash function that randomizes mark-carry bit position.
2) Koushanfar and Potkonjak developed a family of realtime watermarking techniques for WSN to embed an authorship signature into a nonlinear optimization problem before solving it [81] . Location discovery is an example of such optimization problems. One possible algorithm for location discovery is acoustic atomic trilateration, where the unknown location of a node is obtained by measuring its distance to a few already located nodes. This process results in a system of equations for which the differences between measured distances and expected distances are minimized to bound the maximal errors.
Three methods are suggested to encode the watermark: addition of new constraints, augmentation to the objective function, and addition of new variables. The first method uses the linear combination of variables defined in the optimization objective function. Then, it partitions the watermark stream into groups of size equal to the number of the existing variables and utilizes a Kolmogrov complexity rule for converting the watermark streams into watermark constrains. For example, if a bit one is assigned to a variable within a group, that variable is included in the linear combination of the variables from that group. The second method encodes the signature by adding terms correspond to the codeword using the enumeration of variables obtained from the Kolmogrov rule. Instead of constraining the problem, the third method adds auxiliary variables to the optimization problem that increases watermarking bandwidth. The proposed methods can effectively insert a watermark during the design of a sensor network, its deployment, data acquisition or data processing phases.
Watermarking Properties: The proposed watermarking method is fully transparent to sensor network middleware and does not change the stand design or operation procedures used for multimodal sensor data fusion. Additionally, the presented methods are resilient against ghost signatures, addition/removal of a new signature, and de-synchronization attacks. From a security perspective, the watermark is encoded using a standard cryptographic technique so that the constraints do not have any statistical regularity. In fact, the PGP package (including MD5 and RSA) along with stream cipher RC4 is used to generate a cryptographically strong pseudorandom bitstream.
3) Guo et al. [82] proposed a fragile watermarking method for authenticating streaming data at the application layer. In this work, a synchronization point is defined as a data element whose hash value h i modular a secrete parameter m is equal to zero. After identifying synchronization points, data stream readings are divided into k groups according to those points. Thereafter, a chain watermark is formed by storing the watermark of every two groups in one of the two. The watermark is generated from the concatenation of the two group hash values and is stored in the LSBs of the data readings within the group. The direction of the watermark chain could be either forward or backward. From a security perspective, forward-chaining and backward-chaining have the same effect on the robustness of the scheme. However, the backward chain is not advantageous as the number of required buffers is not under control. If the watermarks are chained backward, the modification made to the previous group affect the verification of the current group and it may be required to process the next group to make the final decision (so 3 buffers are required). Hence, the forward watermark chain can facilitate the watermark detection while at the same time minimizes the required resources.
Watermarking Properties: Watermark invisibility is defined as maintaining the usability of watermarked streaming data. Since small distortion is introduced to data items, the usability of data streams is preserved. Using LSB replacement, the watermark length is equal to the group size. The authors have suggested to replace the least two significant bits instead of one to decrease false positive, if the data stream could tolerate a few more modifications. The proposed scheme is robust against insertion, deletion and modification of either a single or multiple data elements. From a security point of view, the keyed group hash value increases the randomness and security of the scheme. Also, determination of synchronization points is based on two secret keys including the seed value of a cryptography hash function K and the parameter m. It is argued that the group size affects the security of the method, but also the tamper detection granularity. Additionally, a few improvements for combating reply attacks are suggested such as attaching a sequence number or a time-stamp to each group to hide the position of synchronization points. 4) Zhang et al. [83] proposed a watermarking scheme for secure data aggregation in sensor networks whereby JPEG compression is considered as the aggregation function. The proposed technique visualizes the sensory data gathered from the whole network at a certain time snapshot as an image, in which every sensor is viewed as a pixel with its sensory data representing the pixel intensity. For watermark encoding, the whole network is divided into L non-overlapping sets in a way that one watermark bit is spread within one subset without interfering with others. Within a subset, all nodes are assigned the same watermark bit with different watermark amplitudes drawn from a Gaussian or Uniform distribution to hide watermark bits into frequency coefficients of the sensory data. After data compression by aggregators, data is routed to the sink. This way, each sensor appends a part of a whole watermark and sink node verify the existence of superposed modulated watermark bits upon receiving the aggregated data and thus authenticate the data without any en-route checking by intermediate nodes. In addition, the authors combined the SS watermark with a temporal one such that for every individual node, each watermark bit is further spread along its different sampling round. The added temporal watermark provides flexibility between detection time and detection granularity.
Watermarking Properties: The watermarking scheme is invisible as the sensory data are modified by imperceptible values that are measured by a sensibility model. The upper bound for the number of watermark bits follows the Shannon's channel capacity L/C = 1.433 × SNR where C is the total available bandwidth and SNR is approximated by the watermark amplitude and variance parameters. For this purpose, an initial discovery phase to estimate these values may be required. The robustness of the proposed spread spectrum technique supports in-network data aggregation that is considered a compression operation here. Also the scheme is robust against node failures with a reasonable degree. The security requirement of the scheme is assessed base on the resilient against intentional attacks. The proposed method can survive false distribution imposition, forgery of coefficient values, non-zero coefficients position switch attacks. Also the watermark amplitude is chosen as a random variable to achieve better security.
5) Chong et al. [1] proposed a provenance encoding technique for unstructured numeric data that is reminiscent of watermarking methods intended to support fair-use policies in the scientific community. The method is a self-identifying technique as data is marked with its own metadata. For this purpose, provenance information is embedded within the LSBs of data. More precisely, an annotated datapoint is constructed from a datapoint with at least 3 insignificant bits that are replaced with a parameter check bit, a mark check bit, and a provenance piece (chosen from N pp distinct provenance pieces). With the aim of the two check bits one can investigate whether watermark m is embedded within the data (one-bit checking), whereas the provenance part is useful to determine which provenance mark is embedded within the data (blind checking).
The parameter check is computed from the hash value of significant bits and the number of distinct provenance pieces (N pp ). The mark check bit is the hash value of significant bits and the provenance mark m. There is a redundancy of provenance bits that have advantage of not requiring all distinct provenance pieces to be available during the decoding process, but also makes the scheme robust to truncation and rounding. The proposed method is also applicable for marking negative integers, floating point numbers and low-entropy datasets. Additionally, the authors proposed a directed search algorithm to decrease search complexity of possible provenance marks during the retrieval process.
Watermarking Properties: The self-identifying scheme is imperceptible in a sense that it does not inhibit standard usage of the dataset because the watermark alterations are within the sensor data error. Also, various statistical measures of dataset (mean and variance) is preserved. The watermark capacity for one-bit checking is zero while the blind checking scheme is able to embed
bits of information if each bit of the provenance mark appears in exactly two provenance pieces (L md is the number of insignificant bits). In terms of robustness, the proposed scheme can survive reordering, sampling, quantization (rounding), truncation, and bit-flipping up to a certain point. The authors stated that the scheme is not a security mechanism per se, so the security of the scheme is not necessary. 6) Sultana et al. [86] proposed a SS watermarking technique for securely transmitting provenance information in sensor networks, whereby watermarks (provenance information) are spread over the inter-packet delays rather than sensory data itself. In other words, the inter-packet delays (IPDs) are dithered according to watermark values. Because delaying a packet for a negative amount of time, is not possible the watermark encoder adds a constant offset in advance to make the provenance values always positive. The watermarked information is then transmitted from sensor nodes to cluster heads or aggregators. Upon receiving data from its children, the aggregator calculates the watermark delay for aggregated provenance and adds its own watermark to the summation of its children watermarks and then deducts the average watermark delays of child nodes to prevent major delays. Since the secret information is not actually embedded within the data, the integrity of timestamps is required by creating a MAC for every data packet.
Watermarking Properties: In terms of transparency, the presented method does not affect the regular behavior of IPDs. The authors showed that only small delays of the same magnitude as natural network jitter are introduced after inserting provenance information. This makes the scheme also invisible to regularity testing traffic attacks. Additionally, the provenance embedding method is robust against multi-flow attacks, replay attacks, fake provenance insertion, provenance forgery, deletion/alteration/insertion of data packets. Each node shares a secrete key with the base station for computing the MAC. To increase the security of the scheme, instead of assigning the delay perturbations (generated watermarks) sequentially to the arrival data packets, they are selected according to hash values of a secret key concatenated with the packet timestamp. It is shown that the prior knowledge of provenance embedding technique is not advantageous for an attacker (Kerckhoffs' principle).
7) The watermarking schemes that we have reviewed so far for secure data aggregation require all data items for watermark verification. This requirement makes those schemes unsuitable for validations of query results because a query often contains a small portion of data items. In contrast, Yi et al. [87] proposed a security protocol called QuerySec for range queries in two-tiered sensor networks with the dual goal of privacy preservation and integrity verification. In these networks, storage nodes are the central point of many attacks, since they not only provide storage for nearby sensors but also process queries that are issued from a sink node. For privacy preservation, QuerySec is designed with an order preserving function-based scheme that allows storage nodes to process encoded queries over encoded data. For integrity verification, a link watermarking method is proposed that embeds hidden marks of every data item into its predecessor. But before that, each sensor sorts its data items in ascending order.
The method assumes that all collected data are in the range (d 0 , d n+1 ) and the lower and upper bounds are known to sink and sensors. After that, a t bits cyclic redundancy code (CRC) is generated as watermark for each data item and is concatenates to its predecessor. For example, assume three data items {2, 4, 5} are collected by sensor S i . Assume d 0 = 1 and d 3+1 = 10, then two bits CRC for every data item can be generated as CRC(2) = 01, CRC(4) = 10, CRC(5) = 11, CRC(10) = 00, after concatenation CRCs, the watermarked data (including lower and upper bounds) is {5, 10, 19, 20, 40}. Upon receiving a query result, sink decrypt the result and extract the watermarks to check whether the data items in the query result can form a link. Additionally, a data structure called multi-dimensional neighbor tree is designed to validate the integrity of multidimensional data. The proposed QuerySec is efficient for sensor networks in terms of power consumption and required space.
Watermarking Properties: The watermark capacity is bounded by the data redundancy space and the cipher block size. For example, using DES of block size 42 bits, if we assume each dimension value of multi-dimensional data items is 16-bit, then 32 bits is left for each block to carry watermark information. QuerySec is a secure protocol as both data and queries are encoded. For this purpose, each sensor has a secrete key shared with the sink.
Additionally, the proposed linked watermarking scheme can survive two types of attacks: insertion of some forged data into the query results and deleting some data items from query results. There is no discussion about watermark invisibility and watermark robustness of the presented scheme. 8) Recently, Boubiche et al. [88] proposed a lightweight security protocol named Cross Layer Watermarking based Data Aggregation (CLWDA) to ensure integrity of aggregated data in heterogeneous WSNs. The cross-layer refers to the interaction between the Network layer and Mac layer to determine the wake-up time of sensors, which is used to decide the position of watermarks within data packets. This way watermark positions are frequently changed and therefore the security of the scheme is enhanced. The presented method provides the flexibility to use other crosslayer parameters for determining watermark positions such as the received signal strength indicator or sender's RSSI. To secure data integrity on resource-constrained nodes i.e. homogenous nodes, the sensory data is XORed with the MAC address of the sensor nodes and then the hash value of the result is dynamically embedded within data packets. The CLWDA protocol takes advantage of an asymmetric cryptosystem to reinforce fragile watermarking scheme at the level of heterogeneous nodes with higher capacity such as aggregators where the generated watermark is encrypted. The accuracy of the aggregate data after fragile watermark insertion is validated for four aggregation functions: (f1) average, (f2) average of those received data where their values are different from a fixed threshold, (f3) difference of received values above a fixed threshold, (f4) variance of the aggregated data.
Watermarking Properties: The presented CLWDA is invisible to data aggregation as the accuracy of the defined aggregated functions (f1 to f4) is preserved. The capacity of the presented scheme depends on the data packet size of the HWSN: The larger the data packet size, the more information can be embedded within the data packet. Also, the security of the fragile watermarking scheme is enhanced with an asymmetric cryptosystem for optimizing data aggregation at sensor level using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) as encryption algorithm. Additionally, the dynamic embedding increases the security of the scheme compared to the static watermarking schemes, where the position of watermarks are always fixed and known. 9) Houmansadr et al. [90] proposed RAINBOW, a nonblind flow watermarking system for linking network flows with high accuracy. To achieve this goal, RAINBOW inflates or deflates an inter-packet delay (IPD) by T RB . If the adjustment made to the i-th IPD is greater than zero, the IPD will be increased; otherwise, it will be shortened. Because a packet cannot be delayed for a negative amount of time, the delay of j-th packet is set to
RB where T 0 is large enough to ensure T j >= 0. In order to make the scheme robust against flow modification, watermark detection is improved by introducing selective correlation. For this purpose, a matching step is added to the detector which uses a sliding window to match IPD values of one flow by those of the other flow. If the absolute difference of the received IPD and the corresponding IPD in database is smaller than jitter variance denoted as η M , packets are passed through as matched. If not, the detector tries to find an IPD in range [j − L, j + L] with the smallest IPD difference which is also smaller than η M and L is the maximum expected change in number of packets. The packet is dropped if no match is found. Therefore, if the percentage of no matching packets is smaller than a threshold, the detector declares the received flow as un-watermarked.
Watermarking Properties: The proposed watermarking method introduces small delays in the order of a few milliseconds which is close to that of natural network jitter. Therefore, the watermarks are transparent to normal users and limited attackers. Additionally, the invisibility of the RAINBOW against information-theoretic detection tools (such as corrected conditional entropy test) is experimentally investigated. The proposed selective correlation makes the scheme robust against flow modification i.e. packet addition and packet removal. The watermark capacity and security of RAINBOW is not investigated.
10) Houmansadr and Borisov [91] presented the first Scalable Watermarking scheme for flow correlation that is Invisible and Resilient to packet Losses (SWIRL). In contrast to RAINBOW that operates on individual delays between packets, SWIRL operates on an interval basis to mark a flow. For this purpose, two intervals are selected: a base and a mark interval. The base interval is used to determine which pattern to insert on the mark interval. Starting from a random offset, a flow is divided into a series of intervals of the same length T SWIRL . Then a mark interval is further partitioned into r subintervals of length T SWIRL /r and each subinterval is split into m slots. After that, SWIRL selects a slot i in each subinterval j according to a permutation π (j) (s) = i where variable s is determined by the basic interval's centroid. Finally each packet from the original slot is delayed to the selected slot. According to experiments, SWIRL is capable of linking correlated flows using flow lengths as short as 2 minutes with maximum error rates of the order 10 −6 .
Watermarking Properties: Similar to RAINBOW, SWIRL is invisible to both benign users and determined adversaries because of introducing small delays close to network jitters. It has been proved that the added delay to each packet is in the range of 0,
. Additionally, SWIRL is also invisible to information-theoretic tools used for covert channel detection. SWIRL enjoys good robustness against network jitter, packet losses, and multi-flow attacks. From a security point of view, SWIRL provides very high entropy of the watermark keys (shared between encoder and decoder) that makes it infeasible for an adversary to guess the watermark key. The secret parameters include initial offset, location of base intervals, location of mark intervals, and permutation for each mark subinterval. In order to increase the security of the scheme against multi-flow attack, the randomized initial offset is not shared between encoder and decoder, as the presented scheme is self-synchronizing.
G. OTHERS
The heterogeneity and variety of today's data inhibits providing comprehensive data type taxonomy. As such, there are still other data types that require special considerations for a successful watermarking application. Data cubes and compressive sensing measurements are two examples of such data that we review in the following section.
Data Cubes: A data cube is a multidimensional data model designed for providing aggregate information. Guo et al. [92] first studied right protection of numerical data cubes by means of digital watermarking. The authors identified two difficulties in marking such data. First, a data cube does not have primary key attribute and therefore, existing watermarking techniques for relational databases are not applicable for such data. Second, those methods do not necessary survive common cube operations such as roll-up and drill-down. The former is the process of viewing data in progressively less detail, whereas the latter is the process of viewing data at more detailed levels.
One simple approach is slightly modifying individual cell values of data cubes. However, this opens up the possibility of significant errors as the result of the accumulated changes made by the marking method. To resolve this problem, the propose scheme follow a mini-cube construction procedure: suppose for a 3d cube, the data value Watermarking Properties: The proposed scheme is imperceptible in the sense that the sum queries on data cubes at any aggregation level are not changed after encoding watermarks. Also the method has reasonable robustness against cell value modification, value selection, additive attacks, and invertibility attacks (using counterfeit watermarks). From a security perspective, the selected cells for carrying watermarks, their bit positions and the bit values are all determined under the control of the owner private key (seed value of the HMAC function).
Compressive Sensing Measurements: In contrast to recent data hiding techniques that adopt compressive sensing (CS) for improving the security of their solutions, Yamac et al. [95] proposed a data hiding method for CS measurements in which the host signal (x) is represented by far few measurements (y) than conventional methods. The key premise in the CS is to reconstruct the N -dimensional vector x, from the m-sparse vector y, i.e. y = Ax, where A is the measurement matrix and m N . The presented method spreads watermark information directly over the CS measurements via an encoding matrix B, i.e. y w = Ax+Bw where w ∈ {+a, −a} M is a binary sequence of length M . The interesting aspect of the scheme is that the embedded information co-exists with the host signal only in the compressed form which means recovery of the signal removes the hidden data. The main difficulty of CS data watermarking is reliable watermark detection that depends on number of CS measurements and is empirically found to be at least m ≥ 4k, where k is the sparsity level. The striking property of the presented scheme is that it can operate with either random modulation of matrices A or B, or transformed matrices (such as noiselets and wavelets), which enables a fast implementation for large size datasets.
Watermarking Properties: The authors proposed a general framework for marking CS data, and therefore the invisibility definition varies based on the target application. For instance, if the presented framework is used for a wireless body sensor network that captures patients' ECGs, the hiding watermark should be preserve cardiovascular diagnostic values. The watermark capacity depends on the properties of the two modulation matrices (in particular the restricted isometry constants of the measurement matrix A and the left annihilator matrix of the encoding matrix B) and the signal to noise ratio. The security of the scheme depends on the secret matrices A and B. In fact, direct data embedding on the CS measurements increases the secrecy of the watermarks that is inherited from compressive sampling through the sensing matrix A, since an adversary cannot reconstruct x using only y in polynomial time. Also it is shown that the linear encoding part (Bw) is secure, if ||Bw|| ||Ax|| is small enough, where ||.|| represents the norm of the matrix.
A summary of the reviewed watermarking techniques are summarized in Table 1 .
V. BIG DATA WATERMARKING
The exponential growth in the amount of generated data through different services such as social networks, monitoring applications, biological investigations, financial systems makes everyone worry about the current state of the developed systems in terms of networking, computation, data storage, and etc. Likewise, the task of ensuring data security is harder as the amount of information is multiplied. The term big data was coined to capture the meaning of this emerging trend. To aim at embracing big data, the design of digital watermarking techniques must be revisited in order to address the challenges that this new trend will face. Big data is not considered as persistent tables, but they are usually generated in the form of transient data streams from various heterogeneous sources. More precisely, the features of big data are characterized by 5V's, namely huge Volume, high Variety, high Velocity, low Veracity and Value [96] . A watermarking system that is adapted for big data environments should address the 5V's in its design as follows:
Volume: The most difficulty in coping with the huge amounts of data to be marked is addressing the scalability aspect of the watermarking method. Watermark scalability has various definitions in different contexts. For example, in fingerprinting applications, a watermark needs to be unique in the sense that it has to uniquely identify each watermarked copy. Thereby, scalability is equivalent to the maximum number of different watermarks that can be distinguished reliably. An explicit notion of scalability for watermarking of pseudoanalog data such as natural images or video, first appeared in the work of Tirkel and Hall [98] , whereby a unique watermark is generated for identification of every image/video at the acquisition hardware of standard cameras. In their construction, a watermark is generated from a collection of various cyclic shifts of a suitable sequence. Following this definition, a line of research in designing data hiding codes and mathematical models capable of scalable watermarking has been conducted in particular for multimedia domain.
The Moreno-Tirkel construction is one of these efforts to increase the possible number of watermarking codes with the cost of reduction in detection accuracy [99] . Apart from that, the data coloring method that was described in Section III, not only aims at uniquely identifying data, but also marks all pieces of the data in a way that, the watermark is detectable even from part of it. Obviously, this increases concerns on the scalability of the data coloring method for very large amount of data as the amount of unique watermarks required for each piece of data can easily increases beyond the limit of the watermarking system. Gross et al. [57] defined scalability as large hidden capacity for query-preserving watermarking of databases and XML documents, where watermarked data is partially available through a set of queries. In this work, the authors showed that the largest possible message size is linked to the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension of the sets 1 defined by queries. This means that watermarking on arbitrary instances is not possible, and there exists a scalable watermarking protocol for structures with bounded VC-dimensions. However, it is unclear whether the VC-dimension is sufficient to obtain a scalable watermarking protocol. Apart from scalability, the ability to watermark a large collection of high dimensional data (i.e. datasets with hundreds of thousands of features) with respect to efficiency turns out to be a major challenge, but has received little attention so far.
Variety: Exploring big data is equivalent to aggregating heterogeneous information from different sources to draw a best possible picture in a real-time fashion. In such an environment, the application often needs to deal with various complex types of data such as structured data, semistructured data, data streams. Many of the existing digital watermarking techniques are rigidly bound to a particular data structure and cannot be used for generic types of data. In order to cope with such a heterogeneous environment, the need for a content-aware watermarking method to retain the information of interest for various data types is paramount. The proposed method by Sion et al. for watermarking of semistructures [56] is an example of such methods. In this work, multi-types of content are marked based on the overall data structure whereas a content-specific mark encoding is used to embed parts of the watermark in the content itself. In this review, we attempted to look at the most common data types used todays to give an insight how watermarking techniques can be designed based on the specific characteristics of the host data.
Apart from the diversity of generated data types, the application requirements can change in a big data environment. For example, in a mobile health application, sharing sentiment information with untrusted parties requires more privacy consideration compared to the sharing with the trusted ones and a context-aware data anonymization method should adjust the level of obfuscation depending on the current context. A major shortcoming of standard watermarking approaches is the inability to adjust embedding parameters because of the predefined setting. Recently, a new trend called intelligent watermarking has emerged to determine embedding parameters based on evolutionary computing and genetic algorithm techniques. For instance, Usman and Khan [101] developed a watermarking system based on genetic programming that is capable of adaptively selecting both frequency band as well as watermark strength in a context-aware manner. As such, the use of intelligent watermarking is highly desirable in contextaware applications where watermarking requirements such as transparency and robustness requirements constantly change.
Velocity: The timely response requirement for big data necessitates the existence of on-the-fly data encoding and decoding techniques for watermarking as well. As we reviewed the watermarking techniques for data streams, such processing is usually based on a window model that makes history-dependent computation cumbersome [80] . Additionally, for time-limited data processes, watermarking should have low complexity to put on in order to keep up with the incoming data rate and low complexity to detect and retrieve marks before it becomes too late to detect tampered labels. For this reason, hardware assisted watermarking such as FPGA implementation [102] is advocated as opposed to software watermarking schemes. For instance, the Morento-Tirkel's multidimensional arrays [99] can be produced on the fly in the most compact Linear Feedback Shift Register's implemented in FPGA's. Additionally, using a pipelined and parallel architecture such as MapReduce could be advantageous to alleviate the processing overhead of watermarking operations [103] .
Veracity: This property of big data translates into incomplete/complete information and uncertainties/ certainties in the captured data from heterogeneous sources. Digital watermarking techniques are useful tools to ensure high data veracity and fraud detection during the whole data lifecycle. One of the critical questions for watermark embedding is that at what point in the data lifecycle should watermarks be embedded? The data lifecycle includes its capture, storage, update, transmission, access, archive, restore, deletion and purge [104] .
Traditional watermarks are usually embedded in a transform domain such as DFT or DCT, leaving data vulnerable to tampering before the transformation. Tirkel and Hall [97] suggested watermarks to be embedded at the very early stage of capturing data, i.e. point of origin before the distribution phase. For this purpose, they inserted watermarks in the spatial domain where the captured data first appeared at a chargecouple device sensor's output. In contrast, Chong et al. [1] argued that transformed data in standard units is preferable to be marked than raw data otherwise the embedding scheme should have to be robust to arbitrary transformations which is difficult to achieve in a real scenario.
In fact, both points of view are valid and for this reason a dual watermarking is desirable -a spatial one to safeguard the data at its origin or for other purposes such as constructing synchronization patterns (watermark registration), and a second one in transform domain to resist domain-specific data manipulations. Therefore, the choice of lifecycle stage for embedding watermark could impact the veracity feature of big data.
Value: This property deals with the monetary decisionmaking of big data for a certain business model. A watermarking solution must be designed with particular respect to the economics of watermark computation such as memory efficiency or power efficiency to ensure low cost implementation, while still offering the required security level. Applying a stringent secure and robust watermarking scheme that poses huge cost for implementation is not a prudent decision. If a watermarking scheme is designed for marking such volume of data, the computational costs of watermark generation, insertion, and detection should be reasonable. This cost could be associated with hardware implementation complexity of the watermarking scheme such as the required space for storing hiding codes or required memory space for processing.
According to the above discussion, the ambition to leverage digital watermarking for big data faces several challenges to address the 5V attributes that future research might be able to find the answers. It necessitates re-thinking of digital watermarking procedures and requirements to be adopted for big data generated from distributed heterogonous sources such as the Internet-of-Things (IoT).
IoT is an emerging internet-based architecture that realizes interconnections of millions of heterogeneous 'thing' through the physical, cyber, and social spaces. Ultimately, these 'things' will generate big data. A typical IoT system involves three main layers including a physical perception layer that collects information from the environment, a network layer that transmit and process perceived environment data, and an application layer that offers context-aware services to end users of the system [105] . Therefore, a crosslayer security solution is required for privacy preservation and trust management in different layers of an IoT system; however, the heterogeneity and wide scale structure of the IoT makes finding such a comprehensive solution a challenging task. This is also a new and exciting area for digital watermarking research.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH A. CONCLUSION
The last decade has seen rapid improvements in the understanding of data hiding techniques. The mainstream research has focused on multimedia though. In this review paper, we motivated the need for and research issues arising from data mining processing model. Following this model, data is not restricted to either multimedia or other form of persistent relations, but rather take a complex format that is affected by data mining and knowledge discovery methods. Therefore, the digital watermarking techniques designed for such data should not interfere with the ultimate goal of data mining process, but also improves the security concerns that are typically application-specific. In this regard, we reviewed the most important watermarking properties and demonstrated how data consumer will dictate what is important in the data that needs to be maintained for a successful watermark application. Finally, we presented some preliminary thoughts on big data watermarking.
B. FUTURE RESEARCH
The authors feel that in the main, the domain of non-media watermarking is still not nearly as mature as that for media. Two broad assertions can be gleaned from the discussions in this paper and its cited papers. Firstly there is little consensus for comparison metrics (beyond the mean square error in its various application based guises), between competing techniques for any given data type or application domain, making the comparison somewhat ad-hoc. This also makes it more difficult to compare across data types. This is reminiscent of media watermarking in its early days. Secondly, the terminology differences between application domains, and their inherent domain-specific assumptions are also not very uniform across papers. It is hoped that the promise of big-data in the watermarking domain heralds the adoption of uniform terminology and standards when considered from the big-data perspective.
The current research agenda in information hiding techniques includes more challenging settings that present an open topic for the future. We anticipate that data hiding techniques in general and digital watermarking in particular will be integrated with other security mechanisms in different layers of the IoT model as a lightweight security mechanism to ensure authenticity and completeness of the collected data. Also, watermarking and fingerprinting techniques could resolve the issue of data ownership in the network of collaborative clouds of things. The main requirements for such data hiding techniques include low complexity, scalability, and the ability of distributed cooperative computations. To the best of our knowledge, little research, if any, addresses all these requirements for a watermarking technique suitable for IoT. 
